Social Continual Planning in Open Multiagent Systems

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Abstract. We describe a Multiagent Planning approach, named Social Continual Planning, that tackles *open* scenarios, where agents can join and leave the system dynamically. The planning task is not defined from a global point of view, setting a global objective, but we allow each agent to pursue its own subset of goals. We take a *social* perspective where, although each agent has its own planning task and planning algorithm, it needs to get engaged with others for accomplishing its own goals. Cooperation is not forced but, thanks to the abstraction of *social commitment* stems from the needs of the agents.

1 Introduction

The ability to plan one's own activities, even in dynamic and challenging scenarios such as Multiagent Systems (MAS), represents a key feature in many real-world applicative domains (see e.g., logistics, air traffic control, rescue missions, and so on). Not surprisingly, planning in MAS is drawing the attention of an ever growing number of researchers, as witnessed by the new series of *Distributed and Multi-Agent Planning Workshops* hosted by ICAPS.

The term Multiagent Planning (MAP) refers to a planning task in which a set of planning agents, each equipped with its own tools and capabilities, has to synthesize a *joint solution* (i.e., a joint multiagent plan). The planning task usually involves a number of interdependent subgoals, so that some form of coordination among the agents is necessary to solve the problem. Different methodologies have been proposed in the literature. Besides centralized approaches (e.g., [2]), which fall outside the above notion of MAP, the other distributed solutions can be categorized into three main families, depending on when the coordination among the agents is actually performed. First of all, coordination can be performed after that each agent has completed its own planning process [8, 9]: each agent works on a portion of the problem, and then coordinates with others to resolve conflicts; this requires that agents exchange with each other their partial solutions, and that they are willing to revise their plans to overcome problems. Second, coordination can be interleaved with the planning process [10, 11, 15]: agents continuously exchange information to achieve a joint solution. Finally, coordination can occur before the planning process. In such a case domain dependent coordination structures are given to the agents as a further input. For instance, in [6] a hierarchical decomposition of tasks and their dependencies is given to the agents in order to guide their local planning processes.

In all the above approaches, the planning task defines a global objective to be achieved by means of a "joint solution" involving the capabilities of the agents. Moreover, the set of agents to be involved is known in advance and cannot change during the planning process; the system is therefore closed. In this paper we deal with a *different planning problem*, and propose a methodology named *Social Continual Planning* (SCP), to tackle it. We consider the planning problem of an agent situated in an open multiagent system. The agent may resort on other agents for solving a task of its own interest. The agent plans both its own actions, and its interactions with others whenever it is not capable, or it deems as not convenient, to execute certain steps in autonomy. The focus is not on negotiation, but on the framework through which an agent seeks the help by the others, and on the *engagements* that bind agents to supporting each other. Interaction is not limited to communication but it is a process through which the involved agents progress each in the solution of its own task. Engagements are binary social relationships, that are established dynamically and that create expectations on the involved agents behavior. An agent autonomously decides (plans) when to bind to another one to do something.

More precisely, we take a *social* perspective in the sense that, even though each agent has its own planning task and uses its own planning algorithm, the agent has still to get engaged with others in order to accomplish its own goals. The interactions that an agent has with others will, in general, allow both parties to get closer to their own goals. Cooperation is not forced to the agents just because they are part of the system, but rather cooperation stems from the needs of the agents within the system, and endures as far as the parties take advantage of it. In other terms, we propose a form of (agent) planning which is *situated* in a multiagent system, where an agent not only has to plan its own actions, but has also to plan its social relationships with other agents. Since the coordination has to be planned, it must be supported by a proper abstraction that enables one agent to create expectations about the behaviors of others. To this end, in this paper we adopt *social commitments* [16]. Interestingly, a recent work by Telang et al. [20] shows how goals and commitments are strongly interrelated by means of a set of practical rules. This supports our intuition that commitments may play a central role, together with beliefs and goals, in the synthesis of a plan in a multiagent setting.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the most relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the necessary background. Section 4 explains our proposal. Section 5 describes the implementation, and exemplify the approach in the logistic scenario. Conclusions and a discussion end the paper.

2 Related Work

To the best of our knowledge, the SCP problem has not been tackled in the literature, so far. It is, however, worthwhile to report the main approaches that are currently discussed in multiagent and distributed planning. Since the seminal work by Boutilier et al. [2], the multiagent planning problem has taken on the perspective of finding a coordinated, joint solution to a given planning task. Agents are therefore seen as resources to be managed so as to achieve the global goal. For instance, in [2] a centralized extension to the Partial-Ordered Planning (POP) approach for dealing with multiple plan

executors was proposed. The solution took into consideration possible concurrency and non-concurrency constraints on the execution of actions that had to be satisfied by any feasible plan.

More recently, distributed approaches have emerged within the planning community. However, even though the planning search can be distributed among the agents, the definition of the planning task is still centralized in most of them. See for instance the MA-STRIPS formalization [4], in which, despite each agent has its own set of (private) actions, the initial state and the goal state of the planning task are globally defined. Similarly, in [21] a multiagent plan is seen as a solution of a coordination problem where constraints on resources and tasks are defined globally.

Distributed approaches can be distinguished on how the planning and coordination phases are actually carried on. First attempts to coordinating plan *after* the planning phases [8, 9] suffered from a sever drawback: whenever conflicts were detected between any two plans, the agents had to revise their plans accordingly. Thus, the domain knowledge about conflicts and constraints was not used actively during the planning phase, but only *a posteriori* to verify the correctness of the joint solution.

This drawback is overcome by approaches (see e.g., [10, 11, 15]) in which the coordination and planning phases are *interleaved*. These approaches rely on the exchange of various kinds of information, such as partial plans, or states inferred during the search, so that conflicts are discovered as soon as possible, and corrections can be made while the planning phase is still in progress. The planning phase is carried on by means of a distributed algorithm, and this implies a form of coupling of the agents. The heterogeneity of the agents is limited to the set of actions they can perform, but the planning strategy must be the same for all the agents in the team. Another implicit assumption in distributed approaches is that agents be cooperative and possibly disclose sensible data, e.g. their internal states and resources, and their local goals. Notably, SECURE-MAFS [3], a recent version of the very efficient MAFS algorithm [15], guarantees, to some extent, the privacy of the cooperating agents; yet, it still requires that each agent knows at least the "public interface" of the other agents' actions. A last family of approaches set the coordination phase *before* the planning one (see e.g., [6]). Such solutions, however, assume that all the possible conflicts are known in advance and globally defined.

For what concerns commitments, only recently there have been some attempts to integrate them in planning problems, see [13, 19, 14] which as well as our work rely on the rules proposed in [20]. The idea of translating pragmatic rules into a planning language is first proposed in [19], where the Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) formalization is used. HTNs, however, are used at design time to model and verify commitment protocols [13]; thus, the point of view of these works is still centralized. In this work we will consider a STRIPS-like representation of the pragmatic rules, and use them for generative planning in a context where a centralized point of view is missing. In other terms, in this paper the interactions via commitments are not outlined within predesigned HTNs, but have to be discovered at execution time by the planning search.

3 Background

3.1 Commitments

The proposal presented in this paper strongly relies on *social commitments* (simply commitments below), as first introduced in [17]. Commitments arise, exist, are satisfied, revoked, or otherwise manipulated, all in a social context. They not only rely on the social structure of the groups in which they exist, but also help create that structure. They are revokable. They overcome the subjectivist bias of traditional AI, so generally the conditions associated to a commitment are evaluated in the world, not in the mind of any agent. More specifically, a commitment $\mathsf{C}(x, y, s, u)$ formalizes a relationship between an agent x, playing the role of *debtor*, and another agent y, playing the role of *creditor*: the debtor is committed towards the creditor to bring about a consequent condition u, whenever an antecedent condition occurs s. Antecedent and consequent conditions are conjunctions or disjunctions of events and commitments and they concern only the *observable behavior* of the agents.

Commitments have a *life cycle*, and we adopt the one proposed in [20], and reported in Figure 1. Briefly, a commitment is *Null* right before being created; *Active* when it is created. Active has two substates: *Conditional* (as long as the antecedent condition did not occur), and *Detached* (when the antecedent condition occurred). In the latter case, the debtor is now engaged in the consequent condition of the commitment. An Active commitment can become: *Pending* if suspended; *Satisfied*, if the engagement is accomplished; *Expired*, if it will not be necessary to accomplish the consequent condition; *Terminated* if the commitment is canceled when Conditional or released when Active; and finally, *Violated* when its antecedent has been satisfied, but its consequent will be forever false, or it is canceled when Detached (the debtor will be considered liable for the violation).

Commitments are manipulated by commitment operations such as: *create* (an agent creates a commitment toward someone), *cancel* (a debtor withdraws an own commitment), *release* (an agent withdraws a commitment of which it is the creditor), *assign* (a new creditor is specified by the previous one), *delegate* (a new debtor is specified by the previous one), *discharge* (the commitment is resolved). In particular, when the



Fig. 1. Commitments life cycle.

consequent condition u holds, the commitment is *discharged*. Notably, only an agent playing the role of debtor can create a commitment.

The reason for relying on commitments stems by the fact that commitments have a *normative* power: Since debtors are expected to behave so as to satisfy their engagements, commitments create social expectations on the agents' behaviors [7]. From a practical reasoning point of view, this means that an agent is expected to behave so as to achieve the consequent conditions of an Active commitment of which it is the debtor. Instead, when the agent is creditor of a commitment, it will set as goal the antecedent condition of the same commitment when it deems it needs the debtor to pursue the consequent condition. Therefore, commitments can be used by agents in their practical reasoning together with beliefs, intentions, and goals for taking into account other agents and the conditions the latter committed to have achieved.

There is a vast literature on social commitments. A comprehensive starting point for the interested reader is [18].

3.2 Goal Formalization

The notion of *goal* plays an important role not only from the point of view of planning, but also in general whenever one has to design and develop intelligent agents. In this paper, we take advantage of the formalization initially proposed in [22], and subsequently revised in [20]; specifically, a goal G is a tuple $\mathsf{G}(x, p, r, q, s, f)$, where x is the agent pursuing G, p is a precondition that must be satisfied before G can be considered active, r is an invariant condition that holds until the achievement of G, q is a post-condition (effect) that becomes true when G is successfully achieved, and finally, s and f are the success and failure conditions, respectively. In other terms, one can think of p as the context in which an attempt to achieve G can be pursued, r as the set required resources, and q as the effects of reaching G. Note that q and s need not to coincide (see [22]). This formalization includes both the specification of an internal procedure (i.e., p, r, and q) that agent x can adopt to satisfy G, and an abstract, declarative success condition s, which is an agent-independent description of G. This complementarity turns out to be fundamental for an agent to decide (1) when cooperation is required (e.g., when no local procedure is applicable), and (2) how to carry through cooperation (e.g., by asking others what success condition bringing about). In the rest of the paper, we will mainly exploit the declarative formalization since we are interested in those cases in which an agent has to cooperate with others.

As well as commitments, goals have a life cycle in which state transitions are triggered by the execution of proper goal actions. Figure 2 shows the goal life cycle [20].

3.3 Pragmatic Rules

In [20] the relation between goals and commitments has been studied, and it has been formalized in terms of practical rules, which capture patterns of pragmatic reasoning. We review in this section a few pragmatic rules through their operational semantics. We first recall the notion of *agent configuration*: the configuration of an agent x is the tuple $S_x = \langle \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{C} \rangle$ where $\mathcal{B}$ is its set of beliefs about the current snapshot of the world, $\mathcal{G}$ is the set of agent's goals, and $\mathcal{C}$ its set of commitments; i.e., commitments in which x



Fig. 2. Goal life cycle

is involved either as debtor or as creditor. We use subscripts from Figure 1 to denote the state of commitments and goals.

The operational semantics of pragmatic rules is given via guarded rules in which S_i are configurations:

$$\frac{guard}{S_1 \longrightarrow S_2}$$

Where $guard$ is a condition over the current agent's beliefs and commitments; whereas $S_1 \longrightarrow S_2$ is a state transition involving a change in the state of commitments or goals; usually it corresponds to an operation on goals or commitments. Pragmatic rules are distinguished into: (1) rules from goals to commitments, they involve commitments that are used as a means to achieve some goal; and (2) rules from commitments to goals, they involve goals that are used as a means to achieve either the antecedent (if the agent at issue is debtor) or the consequent (if creditor) condition of a commitment.

Rules From Goals to Commitments. These rules address situations in which an agent manipulates (e.g., create, or cancel) a commitment to achieve a goal it cannot obtain alone, or to drop a goal is no longer required. Let $G \in \mathcal{G}$ be an agent goal $\mathsf{G}(x, p, r, q, s, f)$, and $C \in \mathcal{C}$ be a commitment $C(x, y, s, u)$ (note that the success condition s of G appears as antecedent in C):

– ENTICE: (Only) by creating the commitment can the agent satisfy its goal. If G is active and C is null, x creates an offer to another agent

$$\frac{\langle G^A, C^N \rangle}{\mathsf{create}(C)} \quad \text{ENTICE}$$

– WITHDRAW OFFER: The commitment is of no utility once the end goal for which it is created no longer exists. If G fails or is terminated, then x cancels C.

$$\frac{\langle G^{T \vee F}, C^A \rangle}{\mathsf{cancel}(C)} \quad \text{WITHDRAW OFFER}$$

Rules from Commitments to Goals. The general idea of these rules is that an agent manipulates a goal to satisfy the antecedent or the consequence of a commitment in

which the agent is involved. Let C be a commitment $\mathsf{C}(x, y, s, u)$; and let us consider two goals $G_1 = \mathsf{G}(x, p, r, q, u, f)$ and $G_2 = \mathsf{G}(y, p', r', q', s, f')$

– DELIVER: The agent activates a goal that would lead to discharging its commitment. If C becomes detached (i.e., goal G_2 has been satisfied), then debtor x activates a goal G_1 to bring about the consequent:

$$\frac{\langle G_1^N, C^D \rangle}{\mathsf{consider}(G_1) \wedge \mathsf{activate}(G_1)} \quad \text{DELIVER}$$

– DETACH: The creditor brings about the antecedent hoping to influence the debtor to discharge the commitment. If G_2 is null and C is conditional, agent y considers and activates G_2:

$$\frac{\langle G_2^N, C^C \rangle}{\mathsf{consider}(G_2) \wedge \mathsf{activate}(G_2)} \quad \text{DETACH}$$

4 The Social Continual Planning Problem

A *Social Continual Planning (SCP) system* is an open environment inhabited by heterogeneous and independent agents. Each agent has its own planning task, and can perform a specific set of actions. A *Social Continual Planning Problem* is a planning problem of an agent, situated within an SCP system, which, for being solved, requires the agent to plan also a set of engagements, realized as social commitments, with other agents in the system. Agents can join and leave the system dynamically; however, we assume that no agent leaves the system as long as there are active commitments involving it either as debtor or as creditor.

More formally, an SCP system is a tuple $\langle \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S} \rangle$ where:

– $\mathcal{U}$ is a finite set of propositional atoms, whose truth value can be observed by all the agents in the SCP; $\mathcal{U}$ represents a sort of common language through which agents can interact. Atoms in this set are used to describe the state of the environment shared by the agents. In addition, these are the atoms that can appear as antecedents and consequents of the commitments.
– $\mathcal{A}$ is a set of agents; each agent $i \in \mathcal{A}$ is associated with a configuration which extends the agent configuration we have already introduced. Specifically, the agent configuration for agent i is a tuple $\langle \mathcal{B}^i, \mathcal{G}^i, \mathcal{C}^i, Acts^i, Socs^i \rangle$: $\mathcal{B}^i$, $\mathcal{G}^i$, and $\mathcal{C}^i$ are as before; whereas:
  - $Acts^i$ is a set of actions agent i can perform; it is partitioned into:
    * Φ^i is a set of "physical" actions; as usual, these actions are defined in terms of preconditions and effects, which can be both conditions on environment atoms (i.e., in $\mathcal{U}$) or on internal (agent-dependent) atoms that are not globally traced (i.e., the internal state of an agent is private).
    * Σ^i is a set of *social actions*; preconditions and effects are defined in terms of goals in $\mathcal{G}^i$ and commitments in $\mathcal{C}^i$. More precisely, each social action corresponds to a pragmatic rule from goals to commitments. Indeed,

we consider these pragmatic rules as actions because, as we discuss below, they can be used by an automated planner to plan interactions with other agents. Note that while goals in $\mathcal{G}^i$ are *private* (only agent i can see and manipulate them), commitments in $\mathcal{C}^i$ have a *social value*: whenever i changes the state of a commitment in $\mathcal{C}^i$, this change becomes visible to all the other agents in the system (see $\mathcal{S}$).

- $Socs^i$ is a set of pragmatic rules from commitments to goals adopted by an agents; from our point of view these rules define the *social strategy* of agent i. Thus, these rules are not used during the planning search, but rather to decide which goals should be pursued.

– $\mathcal{S}$ is the social state shared by all the agents in the SCP system at hand. The social state can be partitioned into two subsets:
  - $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$ is the set of all the active commitments defined between any two agents in $\mathcal{A}$; in particular, for each agent $i \in \mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{C}^i \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, $\mathcal{C}^i$ is the projection of $\mathcal{S}$ over all the commitments in which i appears either as debtor or as creditor.
  - $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$ is the set of all the propositional atoms describing the environment that hold at a given time; in particular, $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$.

Given an SCP system $\langle \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S} \rangle$, let $i \in \mathcal{A}$ be an agent, that is described by the tuple $\langle \mathcal{B}^i, \mathcal{G}^i, \mathcal{C}^i, Acts^i, Socs^i \rangle$. An SCP problem for i amounts to finding a plan, composed by $Acts^i$ and $Socs^i$, to achieve $\mathcal{G}^i$ starting from $\mathcal{B}^i$. In particular:

– $\mathcal{B}^i$ is the initial state of the planning task i is responsible for; such a state is a set of atoms possibly occurring in $\mathcal{U}$, but also occurring in a private set of atoms describing the internal state of i, and hence these atoms are not traced within the SCP system. We only assume that i joins the SCP system iff $\mathcal{S} \cup \mathcal{B}^i \not\models \bot$.
– $\mathcal{G}^i$ is a list of goals the agent has to achieve; each goal can be an atom or a conjunction of atoms in $\mathcal{U}$ and possibly in the private set of agent's atoms. Note that, differently from classical planning, it is not required that all the goals in $\mathcal{G}^i$ hold in a unique system state.
– $\mathcal{C}^i$ is initially empty.
– Φ^i is a set of domain-dependent actions agent i can directly perform whenever their preconditions hold. For instance, in a logistic domain, a truck-agent can perform action `drive`, whereas a plane-agent can `fly`.
– Σ^i can be initialized in different ways; in fact, differently from Φ^i, this set needs not to be static; on the contrary, it could change over time according to contextual conditions. In our preliminary implementation, we have adopted a very simple solution. Let us consider the ENTICE rule above[1]. The objective of this rule is to create a commitment of the form $C(i, j, s, u)$, in order to "entice" another agent j to bring about s, which is of interest for i. At this initial stage, however, i cannot know which condition u is of interest for j. Surely enough, i knows which atoms it can directly achieve by performing its physical actions. Thus, for each atom $s \in \mathcal{U}$ such that s never appears as an effect of any action in Φ^i, agent i creates a template `entice-`s whose effect is the creation of a commitment $C(i, \_, s, u)$, where $\_$ denotes any agent willing to satisfy s, and u is any atom in $\mathcal{U}$ that appears in

[1] Other rules are treated consequently.

Algorithm 1 Social Continual Planning Strategy

SCP-Strategy$(\mathcal{B}^i, \mathcal{G}^i, \mathcal{C}^i, Acts^i, Socs^i)$
1. **while** $\mathcal{G}^i \neq \emptyset \vee \mathcal{C}^i \neq \emptyset$ **do**
2. **on** $\mathcal{S}$ **change** update $\mathcal{G}^i$ using $Socs^i$
3. $g \leftarrow$ pick up a goal from $\mathcal{G}^i$
4. $\pi \leftarrow$ plan to g
5. $status \leftarrow$ execute π
6. **if** $status$ equals $success$ **then**
7. $\mathcal{G}^i \leftarrow \mathcal{G}^i \setminus \{g\}$
8. **end if**
9. **end while**

the effects of at least one physical action in Φ^i. Of course, since the `entice-`s template can be instanced in different ways, depending on the actual u condition, agent i will offer first the conditions, that from its point of view, are the cheapest to achieve.

– $Socs^i$ is a static set of rules, decided at design time, that defines the social behavior of i; namely, how an agent is reliable for bringing about the consequent and antecedent conditions of the commitments in $\mathcal{C}^i$.

4.1 Social Continual Planning: the Strategy

Basically, the SCP strategy we propose, sketched in Algorithm 1, is a form of continual planning (see e.g., [5]) in which generative planning is interleaved with plan execution. The main difference with other approaches is that to achieve a goal, an agent plans not only its own actions, but also its engagements with others, and depending on how these interactions carry through, the agent may decide to perform some replanning or to pursue a different goal.

An agent i follows the SCP strategy as far as there are goals in $\mathcal{G}^i$ to be achieved or $\mathcal{C}^i$ is not empty. This second condition assures that an agent does not leave the system when it is still involved in some active commitments.[2] At each iteration, the agent checks for updates in the social state $\mathcal{S}$ (line 2); any change occurring in $\mathcal{S}$, in fact, can have an impact on the set $\mathcal{G}^i$ of goals. For instance, a new commitment $C(j, \_, s, u)$ appearing in $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$ could draw the attention of agent i when u is a condition that i needs but it cannot achieve on its own, and at the same time i knows how to obtain s. In such a case, i could accept to be the *creditor*: s is added to $\mathcal{G}^i$ (i will eventually bring about s). On the other hand, the occurrence of a new atom in $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$ could make the achievement of a goal g in $\mathcal{G}^i$ no longer necessary, so g is dropped. Of course, these agent's decisions are driven by the $Socs^i$ behavioral rules.

[2] In principle, an agent may remaining situated within the system indefinitely, waiting for agents to cooperate with. For example, in a logistic domain, a shipper has the high-level objective of earn money by offering its transportation facilities. This objective does not immediately translate into an initial goal $\mathcal{G}$, but rather it is better modeled in terms of pragmatic rules (i.e., both social actions in Σ, and behavioral rules in $Socs$), so as the shipper is willing to accept requests from other agents, but also offers itself shipment services to others.

Once $\mathcal{G}^i$ has been updated, agent i selects one goal g from $\mathcal{G}^i$ (line 3); and synthesizes a plan π reaching g (line 4). It is worth noting that any off-the-shelf planner can be used to synthesize π since from the point of view of the planner there is no distinction between social and physical actions (both kinds of actions are translated into PDDL, see below). We only assume that in case the used planner produces a partial-order plan (POP), π is one of the possible linearizations of such a POP.

After the planning step, the agent can start the execution of π (line 5), which contains both physical actions in Φ^i, and social actions in Σ^i. The execution of π proceeds one action a at a time and in the order. If a is a physical action, it is immediately executed, and its effects on atoms in $\mathcal{U}$ are made available to all the other agents via $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$. If a is a social action, e.g., an `entice-`s action, the action execution affects $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$ with the addition of a new commitment $C(i, \_, s, u)$, which has to be picked up by some other agent. The execution of π is therefore suspended; indeed, the `entice-`s action is part of π only in case the atom s is a precondition for some subsequent action, and hence the plan execution cannot proceeds without s. In case an agent j is interested in u, it accepts the offers by finalizing the commitment in $C(i, j, s, u)$, and eventually it will bring about s. As soon as s is satisfied, i proceeds with the execution of its plan (u will be added to $\mathcal{G}^i$ the next time i checks for changes in S). When all the actions in π are performed, the execution phase terminates in *success* state (i.e., g has been achieved), and hence g is removed from $\mathcal{G}^{\rangle}$ (line 7).

However, it is also possible that no agent is interested in the service u offered by i. To avoid an indefinite wait, i sets up a timer. As soon as the time runs out, the commitment is canceled from $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$, and the plan execution terminates with a *failure* state. Since g has not been achieved, it is not removed from $\mathcal{G}^i$. At the next iteration of the strategy, i first checks whether g is still required (line 2), and then tries to find an alternative plan reaching it (line 4) that may require a different instantiation for the `entice-`s action (i.e., with a different condition offered as consequent of the commitment).

Intuitively, the correctness of the approach relies on the coherence and convergence properties discussed in [20]. In particular, the goal convergence property states that in the situation in which agent i has a goal G_1=$\mathsf{G}(i, p_1, r_1, q_1, s, f_1)$, another agent j has a goal G_2=$\mathsf{G}(j, p_2, r_2, q_2, s, f_2)$, and there exists a commitment $C_1 = C(i, j, s, u) \in \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$, then, there is a finite sequence of pragmatic rules that leads to $G2$'s state equaling G_1's state. This means that whenever agent j brings about s, satisfying its internal goal G_2, then, also agent i has its own goal G_1 indirectly satisfied. This demonstrates the correctness of the SCP strategy in the sense that whenever a plan π, synthesized by i, contains an entice action `entice-`s, which actually creates the commitment C_1, then the plan is:

1. *feasible*: no action a in π has open preconditions (i.e., atoms that are neither provided by the initial state nor by any previous action); this implies that the preconditions that agent i cannot directly produce, are obtained via cooperation with others;
2. *correct*: if each action is performed successfully, g holds in $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$ at the end of π; as noted above, the execution of social action implies the cooperation with other agents.

5 Implementation and Proof of Concept

To verify the feasibility of the SCP strategy, we implemented a proof-of-concept in C and SICStus Prolog 4.3.2. More precisely, an agent is implemented as an independent C program that embeds a simple Prolog planner. Each agent takes in input three files:

1. the description of the planning domain (in PDDL 2.2) from the point of view of a single agent, e.g., the templates of the physical actions the agent is capable to perform;
2. the definition of the planning problem (in PDDL 2.2) that this specific agent has to accomplish;
3. the list of environment objects, namely, those objects that constitute the ontological backbone shared by all the agents in the SCP system. All the possible atoms about these objects must be known by the all the agents.

Note that the parsing of the three files creates a number of initial structures within the Prolog planner, as for instance the list of action templates. This list is subsequently completed with a list of social actions (i.e., actions in Σ), following the procedure sketched above. This step consists in instantiating the predefined PDDL templates encoding the pragmatic rules from goals to commitments. For instance, a number of entice actions are created by instantiating the following template:

```
(:action entice
  :parameters (?deb ?cre - agent
               ?ant ?cons - goal)
  :precondition (and
    (active-G ?deb ?ant)
    (not (achieved ?ant))
    (cando ?deb ?cons)
    (null-C ?deb ?cre ?ant ?cons)
   )
  :effect (and
    (not (null-C ?deb ?cre ?ant ?cons))
    (active-C ?deb ?cre ?ant ?cons)
    (increase (plancost) 10)
   )))
```

where a dummy symbol is used to refer to the creditor agent `?cre`, not known at this time. `active-G` and `null-C` are terms used to define goals and commitments, respectively, with their current state. `?ant` and `?cons` goals are unique identifiers associated to atoms such as `at(pkg1, E)`. These identifiers are therefore shared by the agents. This workaround was necessary to overcome the current limits of the PDDL expressiveness for which nested terms are not admissible. This instantiation is realized as a C procedure. The generated instances are injected within the Prolog planner by using the C/SICStus bi-directional interface. Finally, note that the entice action is associated with a cost, this is used to avoid the planner resorts to them even when they are not strictly required (e.g., a "lazy" agent could ask others to obtain goals it can achieve by itself).

The social state is implemented by relying on the Inter-Process Communication facilities offered by the Unix operating system. In particular, two segments of shared memory are used, one for $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$ and one for $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$. Initially both segments are empty, but active processes take turns filling up the $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$ segment by publishing the public facts they know about the environment objects (Unix semaphores are used to guarantee the consistent access to the shared memory segments). If a contradiction arises at this step, the agent terminates without joining the SCP system (i.e., without attempting to solve its task). So far, behavioral rules that specify the social strategy $Socs$ are implemented directly in C. Indeed, only a subset of the rules discussed in [20] have been implemented. For simplicity, we have implemented only progressive rules that any "honest" agent should follow; so our agents never cancel a commitment, and always pursue the goals appearing in the antecedent and consequent conditions of commitments in which they are involved.

After this preliminary steps, each agent can start solving its task by invoking the embedded planner. Note how the facts maintained by the planner correspond to the private belief state $\mathcal{B}$, whereas facts that are maintained in the shared memories correspond to the social state. (For efficiency reasons, though, each planner replicates in its own working memory the facts in the social state.)

5.1 Example: a Logistic Domain

Let us exemplify the SCP strategy via a simple problem from the well-known logistic planning domain. Figure 3 shows the current state of the SCP system at hand: `A` through `F` are cities; `C` and `D` have airports, and plane $pln1$ can fly between them; trucks $trk1$ and $trk2$ can drive along the solid edges connecting the cities.



Fig. 3. Initial state of the logistic example.

In such a scenario, the only shared object in the environment is represented by the package $pkg1$, currently located at `B`. Thus, $\mathcal{U}$ contains all the atoms about such an object, which in the logistic domain concern its position, specifically: $\mathcal{U}$=$\{at(pkg1, A)$, $at(pkg1, B)$, ..., $at(pkg1, E)$, $at(pkg1, trk1)$, $at(pkg1, trk2)$,$at(pkg1, pln1)\}$.The set of agents is therefore $\mathcal{A}$=$\{trk1$, $trk2$, $pln1\}$; whereas, for the sake of simplicity, we suppose the social state $\mathcal{S}$ is currently empty.

Note that, since $\mathcal{U}$ refers only to the package position, the position of each agent is a private piece of information. Moreover, also the domain knowledge is partitioned: $trk1$

Table 1. The first four steps of the SCP strategy

steps	goal	plan	social state
1	tkr1: at(pkg1, E)	trk1: drive(A,B); load(pkg1, B); entice-at(trk1, _, at(pkg1, E), $100)	$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$:{at(pkg1,trk1)}, $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$:{$C$(trk1, _, at(pkg1,E), $100)}

2	trk2: at(pkg1, E)	trk2: drive(F, D);
		entice-at(trk2, _, at(pkg1, D), at(pkg1, E));
		load(pkg1, D); drive(D, E);
		unload(pkg1, E)
			$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$:{at(pkg1,trk1)},
			$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$:{$C$(trk1, trk2, at(pkg1,E), $100),
			C(trk2, _, at(pkg1, D), at(pkg1, E))}

3	pln1: at(pkg1, D)	pln1:
		entice-at(pln1, _, at(pkg1, C), at(pkg1, D));
		load(pkg1, D);
		fly(C, D); unload(pkg1, C)
			$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$:{at(pkg1,trk1)},
			$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$:{$C$(trk1, trk2, at(pkg1,E), $100),
			C(trk2, pln1, at(pkg1, D), at(pkg1, E)),
			C(pln1, _, at(pkg1, C), at(pkg1, D))}

4	trk1: at(pkg1, C)	drive(B,C); unload(pkg1)	$\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$:{at(pkg1,C)}, $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{E}}$:{$C$(trk1, trk2, at(pkg1,E), $100), C(trk2, pln1, at(pkg1, D), at(pkg1, E)), C(pln1, trk1, at(pkg1, C), at(pkg1, D))}
....	...	...	...

just needs to know how to move among A, B, and C, whereas it needs not to know how the other cities are connected.

Let us consider the problem from the point of view of truck $trk1$. Its local planning task consists in delivering package $pkg1$ to E. This is formalized as follows:

- $\mathcal{B}^{trk1}$=$\{at(pkg1, B), at(trk1, A)\}$,
- $\mathcal{G}^{trk1}$=$\{at(pkg1, E)\}$,
- $\mathcal{C}^{trk1}$=$\emptyset$,
- Φ^{trk1}=$\{drive(A, B), drive(A, C), \ldots, load(pkg1, A), unload(pkg1, A), \ldots\}$
- Σ^{trk1}=$\{entice - at(trk1, \_, at(pkg1, E), \$100)$, $entice{-}at(trk1, \_, at(pkg1, D), \$100), entice{-}at(trk1, \_, at(pkg1, F), \$100), entice{-}at(trk1, \_, at(pkg1, E), \$1000), \ldots\}$

Note that Φ^{trk1} contains those actions that are typically defined in the logistic domain for a truck whereas Σ^{trk1} contains all the social actions agent $trk1$ is willing to use during its planning search. In particular, there are more entice actions sharing the same antecedent but differing in the consequent. This is the result of the instantiation procedure of the entice template. For instance, $trk1$ can either pay \$100 or \$1000 to have $pkg1$ at E. Of course, a proper usage of action costs would drive the planner in creating "cheaper" commitments first.

Agent $trk1$ starts the solution of its local planning task by finding a plan reaching the goal $at(pkg1, E)$. The execution of such a plan starts a course of engagements that will involve all the agents. Table 3 summarizes the first four runs of the SCP strategy followed by the agents. Each row in the table shows which goal a specific agent is pursuing, the plan that has been synthesized by the agent, and how the execution of the plan (until the first social action) changes the social state.

The first row of the table shows the plan inferred by $trk1$: after having picked up package $pkg1$, the agent, that cannot physically deliver it to E, offers \$ 100 to any agent

willing to take $pkg1$ to E. Agent $trk2$ accepts the offer, see row 2, and plans how to achieve the goal. Also the $trk2$'s plan contains an offer towards any other agent which is willing to take $pkg1$ to D, which is accepted (see row 3) by agent $pln1$. To keep the discussion simple we assume that the agents are cooperative, and omit the fact that $pln1$ could ask $trk2$ to do something specific in exchange (e.g., pay for the shipment service). In row 4 we have that agent $trk1$ brings $pkg1$ to C where $pln1$ is waiting for loading and flying it to D, from which $trk2$ will take it to E. Note that the execution of the agents' plans will progressively satisfy goals and commitments that will be removed from the social state.

5.2 First Experiments

We have used the logistic domain as a test-bed for a preliminary experimental analysis. At this stage of development our main objective was to study the feasibility of the approach, and to highlight possible bottlenecks and shortcomings of the SCP strategy, in particular as concerns the instantiation of the entice action.

In a domain involving 2 trucks and 2 planes, we prepared 10 problems. In each problem, every agent was assigned with one package to be delivered. In all the cases, the agent could not deliver the package without the help of at least one other agent. Although the implementation is yet to be engineered, the first data we collected are very encouraging. On average, the instantiation of the entice action produces 68 instances for each agent. Such a large number of action could represent a burden for the planner, but in practice the planner we used (implementing a simple A* search) worked very efficiently; in fact, the planning times are on average 1500 ms, with a pick to 8000 ms only in one case. The length of the synthesized plans is 15 actions, on average, with a pick to 24.

These results show that, even though the instantiation of the entice action can produce a relatively large number of actions, the planner is not significantly burdened by them as in general only a few of them are applicable at the same time. In other words, the number of entice instances is not directly related to the search branching factor.

6 Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper we addressed the SCP problem, and proposed the SCP strategy as a possible solution. Differently from MAP approaches, where a predefined team of agents has to find a *joint* plan solving a given planning task, here we deal with situations in which each agent is given a planning task which is independent of the others' ones. The challenge, thus, is not to find a joint plan, but to find a plan for each agent that solves the agent's planning task taking advantage of the cooperation with other agents. Moreover, agents are free to join and leave the system dynamically.

The novelties of our proposal are not limited to the openness of the agent team. While in approaches to MAP agents can be thought of as resources used for solving the given planning task, in SCP agents are seen as *autonomous* entities. This change implies that an agent cannot order another agent to do a job, but the agent can just make an offer, and as we have seen, social commitments come at handy to model this kind

of relations. More importantly, however, we have to observe that an agent receiving an offer, being an autonomous entity, can accept or reject the offer depending on its contextual conditions and its local goals. A rational agent, in fact, should accept an offer only if the offer brings along some advantages, otherwise the offer should be put aside.

It is worth noting how the SCP strategy supports the *decoupling* of agents, that just share environment objects, whereas they are independent for all the other respects. In particular, each agent can implement its social strategy (i.e., pragmatic rules in $Socs$ and Σ) according to local criteria. Moreover, the planning algorithm each agent uses can be tailored to meet optimization functions that are relevant for the agent itself. Note also how the cooperation among the agents do not require that an agent knows the action templates of others (as for instance happens in [15]), and, hence, also the agents' privacy is preserved.

Many lines of research and improvement are possible. In the near future we aim at engineering the implementation of the SCP strategy by exploiting one of the many agents platforms available. In particular, the JaCaMo+ platform [1] seems to be a good candidate since it naturally supports the notions of commitments and social states. In addition, the social behavioral rules in $Socs$ could find an easy implementation as Jason plans (used to program JaCaMo+ agents). Also the integration with a planner does not seem to raise to much troubles; as demonstrated in [12] where Jason plans have been integrated with generative planning.

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