Introduction

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The debate on context dependence of expressions has many roots: the logic-philosophical tradition, starting with Gottlob Frege and his context principle, has developed– with David Kaplan – a paradigm of formal semantics of context-dependent expressions like indexicals and demonstratives. The debate on commonsense reasoning – starting with John McCarthy – has produced a great amount of works on contextual reasoning and on the relations among contexts. Debates in pragmatics, starting with the seminal work of Paul Grice, have posed relevant worries on the traditional paradigm and challenged the boundaries between pragmatics and semantics.

This discussion is characterized by a range of different proposals about the contextual dependence of 'what is said' by an utterance. On the one hand, according to the traditional semantics framework, *Minimalism* says that 'what is said' by an utterance is fully determined by syntax and semantics, to the effect that sentences *per se* have invariant truth conditions. In this view, context contributes to the semantic interpretation of only a *Basic Set* of expressions including pure indexicals ('I', 'here', 'now'), demonstratives ('this', 'that') and some contextual expressions like genitive constructions. On the other hand, *Weak* and *Radical Contextualism* claim that the semantic values of many other linguistics expressions depends on the context. Hence the same sentence might have different contents in different contexts. The linguistic meaning of a sentence underdetermines the semantic interpretation, therefore 'what is said' by an utterance, corresponds to truth conditions that are the result of a contextual modulation. Recently, a number of proposals drawing on relativizing truth in semantics, have opened new theoretical perspectives. According to *Relativism*, the content of a sentence remains constant through different contexts of use. However, the proposition varies in truth-values with extra parameters, i.e. epistemic, moral or taste standards, which are added to the possible world in the circumstances of evaluation. Some part of

the problem is therefore linked to different conceptions of what is said, and among the many attempt to clarify these difference, John Perry developed the idea of multi-propositionalism, that is the idea that truth conditional content may depend on different levels of what is said.

The third[*] Genoa-Workshop on Context addresses this debate. Its first aim is to challenge the main current perspectives on context dependence. The main issue might be divided into three broad questions.

Where to posit contextual dependence? In the context of utterance or in the context of evaluation? In hidden indexes in the syntax or in the structure of the lexicon? *How* what is said is context dependent? Is context dependence a bottom up process of a top down process? *What* is considered context dependent? Shall we consider only the basic set of indexicals and demonstratives or shall we enlarge this set and to which extent?

The following abstracts introduce to reader to some of these topics.

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[*] The first workshop in 2000 was an attempt to help philosophers and computer scientists to interact on the topic con context, with the participation of most of the papers have been collected in a volume edited by Carlo Penco, *La svolta contestuale* (*The linguistic turn*), Mc Graw Hill, Milano, 2002. The speakers were: Eva Picardi (Bologna), Carlo Penco (Genova), Marcello Frixione (Salerno), Massimiliano Vignolo (Vercelli), Alessandro Zucchi (Salerno), Marina Sbisa' (Trieste), Nicla Vassallo (Genova), Margherita Benzi (Genova), Fausto Giunchiglia (Trento), Chiara Ghidini (Manchester), Paolo Bouquet (Trento), Massimo Benerecetti (Napoli), Luisa Montecucco(Genova), Roberta Ferrario (Trento), Luciano Serafini (Trento), Claudia Bianchi (Paris), Stefano Predelli (Oslo).
The second workshop in 2002 have been devoted to the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, and some of the papers have been collected in a volume edited by Claudia Bianchi, *The semantics-pragmatics distinction*, CSLI, Stanford, 2004. It has been the largest workshop, with the participation of many speakers with different orientations: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University), Anne Bezuidenhout (University of South Carolina), Manuel Garcia Carpintero (Universitat de Barcelona), Robyn Carston (University College, London), Stephen Neale (Rutgers University), Stefano Predelli (Universitetet i Oslo), François Récanati (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), Kenneth Taylor (Stanford University), Jonathan Berg (University of Haifa), Emma Borg (University of Reading), Paolo Bouquet (University of Trento), Gennaro Chierchia (University of Milano), Eros Corazza (University of Nottingham), Carlo Penco (University of Genoa), Sandro Zucchi (University of Salerno), Diego Marconi (University of Oriental Piedmont).

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Speech acts in context

Claudia Bianchi

Indexicality is at the core of many major philosophical problems. In recent years, recorded messages and written notes have become a significant test and an intriguing puzzle for the semantics of indexical expressions. In this paper, I argue that a parallel may be drawn between the determination of the reference of the indexical expressions in recorded messages or written texts, and the determination of the *illocutionary force* of recorded or written utterances.

Many scholars underline that, in some cases, the referents of utterances of "here" and "now" are not obtained by applying their characters to the context of utterance: examples involving the message of an answering machine or a written note cannot be evaluated with respect to the context of utterance or inscription. Consider the message of an answering machine like

(1) I'm not here now

The message seems to have a paradoxical content: the speaker of the utterance is not at the place of the utterance at the time of the utterance. Yet, intuitively, an utterance of (1) may well be true. Or imagine that John, while in his office, writes a note reading:

(2) I am here,

and then, arrived home, leaves it in the kitchen, to let his wife Mary know that he is back from work: the note is not informing Mary that John is in his office (the place of utterance or inscription), but rather that he is at home.

In order to determine the reference of the indexical expressions in (1) and (2), we must fix the relevant context. Apparently, we have two candidates:

a) the context in which the utterance is recorded or produced - *encoded*;
b) the context in which it is heard or read - *decoded*.

There are two possible alternatives which allow us to remain within a traditional semantic framework. The two alternatives are the *Many Characters View* and the *Remote Utterance View*.

- According to the *Many Characters View*, there are two characters associated with the indexical "now": one for the time of production of the utterance containing "now" (the coding time) and one for the time the utterance is heard or read (the decoding time).

But associating two characters with "now" or "here" amounts to multiplying meanings unnecessarily, and to accepting the unpleasant and counterintuitive conclusion that indexicals have more than one meaning.

- According to the *Remote Utterance View*, written notes and recorded messages allow a speaker to utter sentences "at a distance", so to speak; in other

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terms they allow the utterance of sentences at time t and location l without being in l at t. In this line of thought, the owner of the answering machine "uttered" (1) when someone phoned, and John "uttered" (2) at home, when his wife read his note.

Let's examine the Remote Utterance View by focusing on an example adapted from Stefano Predelli. Suppose that, before leaving home at 8 'o clock in the morning, Ridge writes a note to Brooke, who will be back from work at 5 o'clock in the evening:

(3) As you can see, I'm not here now. Meet me in two hours at "Le Café Russe".

Intuitively, the note does not convey the (false) content that Ridge is not at home at the time of utterance (the coding time) of the note, nor does it ask Brooke to be at "Le Café Russe" at 10 o'clock in the morning – namely two hours after Ridge wrote the note. Therefore, the Remote Utterance View would conclude that a) must be ruled out: the relevant context is b), the context in which the note is read, or decoded. Ridge "uttered" (3) at 5 p.m., when Brooke came home from work.

A parallel may be drawn between the determination of the reference of the indexical expressions in recorded messages or written texts, and the determination of the illocutionary force of recorded utterances. Written texts (but also recorded radio or TV programs, films, and images) may be seen as *recordings* that can be used in many different contexts – exactly like an answering machine message. Let us examine the example of a sign reading

(4) I do

created by Brooke as a multi-purpose sign and used by her in different contexts to get married, to agree to return her books in time to a library or to confess to a murder. The question is to establish which context determines the speech act performed by an agent using a recording:

a) the context in which the sentence is recorded or produced;

   b) the context in which the sentence is heard or read.

According to a version of the Remote Utterance View for speech acts (endorsed by Jennifer Saul, among others), the different speech acts performed by Brooke depend on features of the contexts in which Brooke *used* the sign (choice b)), and not on features of the context in which she made it (choice a)). She may use (4) in a church to get married, in a library to agree to return her books on time, or in a police station to confess to a murder: it is the context in which the sentence is used that determines the illocutionary force of the speech act performed by the agent.

However, we may find some powerful arguments against b). Let's go back to indexical sentences like (3). Predelli imagines that Brooke comes home late, and reads (3) at 10 p.m. Intuitively, Ridge is not inviting her for dinner at midnight: she must interpret the message not in relation to her actual time of arrival but to her expected time of arrival (the expected decoding time) – an intuition the Remote Utterance View cannot account for. In order to account for examples (1) – (3), Predelli suggests that we distinguish between the context of utterance (or inscription) and a context the speaker considers semantically relevant, that is the (intended) *context of interpretation.* The character of "now" in (3) applies neither to the context of utterance/inscription, nor to the decoding context. In (3), the context giving the correct interpretation contains, as the temporal co-ordinate, Brooke's expected time of arrival (5 p.m.) and not the moment Ridge wrote the note (8 a.m.) or the moment Brooke came home (10 p.m.): this intended context provides the correct values for "now and "in two hours", i.e. 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., while keeping the usual characters for the two expressions.

Let's now turn to speech acts. According to the version of the Remote Utterance View for speech acts, in order to determine the illocutionary force of the different

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speech acts performed by Brooke, we must focus on the different *decodings* of (4) (hearings or viewings: choice b)). Different viewings of a written utterance or different hearings of a recorded message, it may be argued, could have different illocutionary forces. It is the context in which an utterance is actually heard or seen (and not the context in which it is recorded) which determines the speech act accomplished by a recording.

If the parallel between indexical expressions and speech acts holds, however, we have a compelling argument against the choice of b) as the context relevant to determine the illocutionary force of a speech act in general, and of a recorded utterance in particular. I claim that to fix the illocutionary force of a speech act, the addressee should not consider (at least, not directly) either the context of production of the utterance, or the context of actual decoding of the utterance. She should instead consider an "intended" context, taken as semantically relevant by the speaker, and *available as such to the addressee*: this context will be the relevant context of interpretation. The illocutionary force of a speech act is fixed only once the intended context is fixed - a determination involving encyclopaedic knowledge of the world and of the speaker's desires, beliefs and intentions.

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2

The Problem of Incompleteness and Some Solutions

Emma Borg

Semantic minimalism as a theory claims that all well-formed sentences of a natural language are capable of expressing a proposition (i.e. a truth-evaluable content) relative to a context of utterance. However, there is a well-known problem for this claim, stressed particularly in the work of Kent Bach, concerning sentences which seem to fail to express complete propositions prior to contextual enrichment. So, for instance, consider 'Flintoff is ready' or 'Steel is strong enough' or 'Paracetemol is better': in each of these cases, it seems that we need to look to a context of utterance in order to determine a complete proposition (i.e. by finding out what Flintoff is ready for, what steel is strong enough to do, and what Paracetemol is better than).

In this paper I want to start by assessing the responses to this kind of problem which can be given by certain non-minimalist approaches (namely, indexicalism, contextualism, and relativism). I will argue that cases of putative incompleteness cause a serious problem for relativism, and that, while the accounts offered by indexicalism and contextualism are more consistent than that offered by relativism, nevertheless concerns remain with the motivation on offer for these accounts.

I will then turn to the minimalist response to sentences like 'Flintoff is ready' and argue that the minimalist has more explanatory resources available to her in dealing with the challenge posed by this kind of sentence than is sometimes allowed. I will argue that there are three distinct explanatory routes the minimalist might pursue:

    (i)   that some cases of putative incompleteness involve genuine indexicality

(ii)   that some cases of putative incompleteness involve hidden syntactic structure

(iii)   that some cases of putative incompleteness are the results of misplaced judgments (i.e. sensitivity to the triviality of the proposition expressed, not to the lack of complete semantic content).

Clearly, stating the options in this way, there may seem to be an obvious concern, namely that the proposals outlined will result in a collapse of the minimalist picture into one of its opponents (e.g. into indexicalism or contextualism), however I will argue that this is not the case. A collapse is avoided in (i) by paying proper attention to the facts which might motivate an analysis in terms of genuine indexicality, while a collapse is avoided in (ii) by paying proper attention to the correct lexical analysis of the expressions of a natural language.

Defending this second response to the challenge of incompleteness will involve looking more closely at the nature of lexical content and the assumptions minimalism makes about the meanings of words. I will suggest that the minimalist approach (often tacitly) assumes that word meanings have two essential features: first, that words in general make a stable contribution to the meanings of larger linguistic units in which they appear and, second, that word meanings at some point involve genuine word-world connections (i.e. minimalism assumes some kind of weak externalism about meaning, see Rey 2006). Meeting these two requirements points us perhaps most naturally in the direction of a broadly referential, atomic account of the meanings of (at least some) non-complex words (e.g. holding that 'Barack Obama' refers to Barack Obama, that 'red' is true of or is satisfied by red things). However, as we will see, Chomsky and others have argued that there are insuperable problems with the idea that word meanings are simple and broadly referential. Thus I will turn to examine the challenges which Chomsky and others have given voice to. These arguments take two forms: on the one hand, there are arguments which seek to show that referential lexical axioms are impossible, while on the other there are arguments which seek to show that externalist content is explanatorily redundant within a semantic theory. I will reject both these lines of argument but will note that there is a significant explanatory burden on a successful semantic theory which is 'internalist' or intra-linguistic in nature. For

instance, it seems that a successful semantic theory should be required to explain the possible and impossible readings of sentences (cf. Pietroski 2005), the apparently non-arbitrary patterns of syntactic distribution which we witness for natural language expressions (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005) and, perhaps, relations such as analyticity, synonymy and polysemy.

So I will then turn to the question of how this intra-linguistic explanatory burden might be carried. One suggestion, endorsed by Chomsky and his followers, is that carrying this burden requires moving away from atomic lexical axioms and towards some kind of lexical complexity, such as that found in theories of inferential semantics or in so-called 'lexical semantics'. However, as is well-known, Fodor and Lepore have raised significant objections to any approach which claims that the meaning of a simple term is given by a bundle of simpler features. I will sketch their objections but stress that they all attack a specific *decompositional* version of lexical complexity and I will argue that not all varieties of lexical complexity need take this form. For instance, the meaning postulates posited by Carnap and others arguably embody lexical complexity without lexical decomposition, and I will outline a second approach, which I will call 'organisational lexical complexity', which specifically posits lexical complexity without decomposition.

On this approach, word meanings are treated as simple and, at least on some occasions, as broadly referential, but additional information about words is held to be encoded within the lexicon itself. According to this kind of organisational lexical semantics words come replete with complex instructions about how to construct the logical forms of larger linguistic units in which they appear, yet *without* this undermining the minimalist assumption that words make a stable, context-independent and world-involving contribution to the meanings of larger linguistic units. So, for instance, it might be the case that 'dog' simply means *dog,* or that 'hit' simply means *hit,* though facts about how these expressions are embedded in the lexicon provide further information about how the terms behave in relation to other expressions (e.g. the kind of argument structures the terms take).

Finally, I conclude by arguing that adopting this kind of organisational lexical semantics could serve two functions for the minimalist. First, it would allow a minimalist semantic

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theory to capture what I called the 'internalist burden' on semantics. Second, it could open the door to a possible explanation for certain cases of incompleteness (e.g. by making it possible to analyse 'Flintoff is ready' as having an underlying logical form which marks two arguments, akin to 'Flintoff is ready for something'). I will explore the motivation for any such explanation of incompleteness and discuss the relationship between organisational lexical semantics and minimal semantics, arguing that the two approaches share the same fundamental aims and motivations, aims and motivations not shared by competitor accounts like indexicalism and contextualism.

My overarching conclusion, then, will be that by adopting an independently attractive account of lexical content (organisational lexical semantics), all three of the above explanatory routes are open to the minimalist in the face of the challenge from incompleteness. Finally, these three solutions in tandem serve to resolve the putative problem of incompleteness for minimalism.

3

Critical Pragmatics: errors, lies and ironies

Joana Garmendia

Pragmatic theories usually start from explaining "paradigmatic" cases, that is, non-erroneous, sincere and literal utterances of declarative sentences. The idea would be to first establish the basis of a general pragmatic account, and then accommodate "other cases" to it.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Critical Pragmatics (Korta & Perry 2006, 2007) can adequately make this step: I will show how we can explain erroneous, insincere and non-literal cases of speech starting from critical pragmatic grounds. I will do so under the pretext of explaining ironic utterances.

4.1 Critical Pragmatics

While we are browsing Mr. Fog's art collection, he claims:

(1) I really like this painting.

Mr. Fog is not intending to deceive us –he actually likes the painting. Neither he is speaking figuratively –he is not looking through the window and talking about the superb colors of the hills in San Francisco during sunset. And he has not made a mistake when uttering (1) –he did not want to say that he likes fainting. Mr. Fog has been sincere, literal and has not made any error. There we have an example of a paradigmatic case of speech.

Critical Pragmatics states that every utterance has a variety of contents, even the most paradigmatic, simple ones. Different contexts would permit different hearers to grasp a different content. Among these contents, there is one that we call the "locutionary content" (P_R) of the utterance, which is overall comparable to what has typically been called "THE content of an utterance;"[†] that is, Perry's (2001) "referential content," "content$_C$" or "official content;" basically, the content obtained after disambiguations, precisifications of vague terms, and the fixing of the references of context-sensitive expressions.

So Mr. Fog uttered (1) "I really like this painting," whose locutionary content is:

(P_R1) THAT **MR. FOG** LIKES **MUNCH'S "THE SCREAM."**[‡]

But it is not just that: Mr. Fog actually believes that he really likes that painting. Well, in fact, he also believes that San Francisco is a beautiful city, that 3 plus 5 is 8, that his mother's name is Loli, and what not. So that one is just one of his many beliefs. However, this belief stands out in Mr. Fog's uttering (1), for it has a special role: it is the belief that he intended to communicate when he uttered "I really like this painting" – it is the belief that motivated his uttering (1).

We call this belief the speaker's motivating belief (MB), and it is the one whose content matches the locutionary content of the utterance in paradigmatic cases, as it happens in this case:

(P_R1) THAT **MR. FOG** REALLY LIKES **MUNCH'S "THE SCREAM."**
(MB_1) THAT **MR. FOG** REALLY LIKES **MUNCH'S "THE SCREAM."**

[†] Following the traditional monopropositionalist dogma –which claims that there is one and only one proposition linked to every utterance (Korta, 2007).

[‡] Following Perry's (2001) notation, boldface stands for the propositional constituent: italic when the constituent is an "identifying condition" or "mode of presentation" and not the object that meets the condition; roman when it is the object and not any condition or mode of presentation.

Let's consider now an ironic example:

X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says:

[(2)] X is a fine friend. (Grice, 1967/1989: 34)

Whoever knows the context of the utterance, will easily guess that A is talking about his coworker X, and so they will grasp the locutionary content of A's utterance without much trouble:

(P$_R$2) THAT **X** IS A FINE FRIEND.

Now, whoever knows that A is talking about X –just the X who has certainly betrayed A— will also know that A does not actually believe that X is a fine friend. And, if THAT **X** IS A FINE FRIEND is not the content of one of A's beliefs, that can in no way be the content of A's motivating belief.

In irony, to begin with, we will always have a mismatching between the content of the speaker's motivating belief and the locutionary content of the utterance. Irony is not a paradigmatic case.

4.2 Mistakes

My aunt Maribel has four daughters, and she often gets their names mixed. Today she wanted to say that Maialen had come, but she uttered:

(3) Begoña has come.

The hearers, as they know Maribel's daughters, will immediately grasp the locutionary content of the utterance:

(P_R3) THAT **BEGOÑA** HAS COME.

That is to say, they will understand that Begoña –Maribel's elder daughter— has come. Nevertheless, Maribel does not believe that Begoña has come; she instead believes that Maialen –her youngest daughter— has come, and that was in fact the belief she intended to communicate –that was her motivating belief.

(MB_3) THAT **MAIALEN** HAS COME.

Just as in the fine friend example, in this case the speaker's motivating belief does not match the locutionary content of the utterance. However, Maribel was not intending to be ironic –she just has too many daughters to remember their names.

There are some differences between this last mismatch and that found in the fine friend example. Maribel's mismatch has not been made intentionally –she has just made a mistake when confusing the names. On the contrary, A was totally aware that he was uttering "X is a fine friend" while not believing that X is a fine friend.

The ironic speaker intentionally mismatches the content of her motivating belief and the locutionary content of the utterance. That intentionality in the mismatching is what distinguishes irony from errors.

4.3 Lies

Irati, 18, is in a San Francisco bar. She knows that the law in California does not allow drinking alcohol unless you are older than 21. When she orders a beer, the barman asks her how old she is. Irati replies:

(4) I'm 21.

The barman can easily grasp the locutionary content of that utterance:

(P_R4) THAT **IRATI** IS 21.

However, Irati does not believe that she is 21. Irati knows very well that she is 18. So the content she has communicated cannot match the contents of her motivating belief. Moreover, Irati has not mixed numbers, has not confused her age, or whatever an error she could have done. Irati has intentionally made an utterance whose contents mismatch the contents of her beliefs –just as our ironic speaker, and unlike our absentminded, mistaken Maribel. But Irati was not being ironic.

In fact, there is a big difference between this last example and irony. When being ironic, the speaker intends the hearer to recognize:

i) that the referential content of her motivating belief and the locutionary content of the utterance are discordant, that is, they mismatch; and

ii) that the speaker intends the hearer to recognize i).

That is to say: the ironic speaker intends the hearer to recognize both the mismatching and her intention to make it recognizable –the ironic speaker's mismatching is *overt*.

And overtness distinguishes irony from lies: when a speaker is lying, as our last speaker, she intends the hearer not to recognize that the contents of her beliefs do not match the contents of her utterance –she does not want the hearer to recognize her lying.

4.4 Ironies

The ironic speaker overtly and intentionally mismatches the contents of her motivating belief and the locutionary content of her utterance. This basic characteristic

carries big consequences for ironic utterances.

To start with, due to the overt mismatching of ironic utterances, the speaker does not commit herself to the locutionary content of the utterance when being ironic (i.e., she does not take responsibilities for believing in its truth). This sets irony apart from the other cases we have considered so far: in every other case the speaker was indeed committed to that content.

Consequently, the ironic speaker does not *say* the locutionary content of the utterance. Saying implies committing (Korta and Perry 2007: 171), and there is not commitment in ironic utterances.

A big question arouses here: why, then, utter a sentence ironically, if it is not to say something? Well, the ironic speaker says nothing, but implicates a content. That content is implicated by making as if to say the locutionary content. For example, our speaker, A, may have intended to implicate something along the lines of:

Ironic content$_1$: THAT **X** IS NOT A FINE FRIEND, THAT **A** HAS BEEN A FOOL BELIEVING IN **X**, THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAVE TRUSTED HIM.

We call this content the "ironic content" of the utterance, since it is the speaker's having implicated them that makes the utterance ironic.

4.5 Conclusion

Explaining non-erroneous, sincere and literal utterances of declarative sentences is just a first step of a long trip. Explaining cases beyond paradigmatic ones would be the next challenge for any general pragmatic account. Here I have shown that Critical Pragmatics can accomplish this mission without much trouble: having left apart the monopropositionalist dogma, errors, lies and ironies can be adequately explained using no more than the basic tools included within our general pragmatic approach.

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4

On Grice's demands on what is said[*]

Kepa Korta

Short Abstract

I'll call the operative content of the utterance (OC, for short) what, in the Gricean framework, constitutes the input for the inference of implicatures of an utterance. After Grice, this is usually known as 'what is said' by the utterance (namely, what is said by the speaker in making the utterance), but this is somewhat misleading, since it is then considered to correspond (in the case of simple utterances involving singular terms) to a single kind of proposition: either a singular proposition (i.e., a proposition involving an individual) or a general proposition (i.e., a proposition involving not an individual but a mode of presentation of it). I'll argue that the OC of an utterance can be any of a variety of contents, including, but not limited to, those two kinds of contents.

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Grice (1967) famously distinguished between *what a speaker says* and *what she implicates* by uttering a sentence. Think about Anne and Bob talking about their common friend Carol, who both know that she recently started working in a bank. Anne asks: "How is Carol getting on in her job?", and Bob replies: "Oh quite well… She hasn't been to prison yet." Bob is clearly suggesting something here; something related to Carol's tendency to yield to the temptation provided by her occupation, as Grice would put it. But that's not something Bob said, but something he implicated in saying what he said.[§] But what did he say?

[§] Grice included in his overall picture of meaning and communication non-linguistic 'utterances' like gestures and movements, but we will limit the discussion to linguistic utterances.

Grice's remarks suggest that his concept of 'what is said' can be taken as equivalent to 'the proposition expressed' or 'the content' of the utterance.[**] He claims that to know what someone said by uttering a sentence one has to know

(i) the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered;

(ii) the disambiguated meaning of the sentence in that particular occasion of use; and

(ii) the referents of referential expressions.[††] (Grice 1967: 25)

There is a debate about the amount of pragmatic 'intrusion' that Grice allows into what is said,[‡‡] but there seems to be a wide consensus that it roughly corresponds to the proposition expressed or the content of the utterance. The question is, what kind of proposition is that?

Limiting our attention to utterances of sentences containing singular terms ---that is, proper names, demonstratives, indexicals and (some uses of) definite descriptions---, traditional philosophy of language offers two general, seemingly incompatible, answers: the proposition expressed is either a singular proposition involving an individual referred to by the singular term (the referentialist view) or a general one, involving a mode of presentation of the individual, provided by its linguistic meaning (the descriptivist view).

Well-known arguments about the subject matter of utterances, same-saying and counterfactual truth-conditions favor the referentialist view. However, interestingly enough, more than half a century earlier Frege anticipated that a pure direct referential account would not do. Well-known arguments about empty terms and co-referential terms favor the descriptivist view. Grice's own remarks are compatible with a referentialist view on what is said. He says (our italics):

[**] This more technical terms used by philosophers are not trouble-free, since they can suggest that implicatures are not contents of the utterance, or that they are not propositional. Gricean implicatures (at least conversational particularized ones) are also full-blown truth-conditional (though more or less indeterminate) contents of the utterance, but I'll ignore this issue here, and follow common practice using 'content' only to talk about the contents that are on the 'what-is-said' part of the Gricean divide.

[††] He leaves it open whether a speaker using a proper name, e.g. 'Harold Wilson', and another one using a definite description denoting the same individual, e.g. 'The British Prime Minister' say the same thing or not (Grice 1967: 25). All references to Grice's works are taken from Grice (1989).

[‡‡] Bach (1994a, b) takes Grice to assume that the elements of what is said must correspond to elements in the sentence uttered. Grice would then be a 'minimalist' regarding the pragmatic intrusion into what is said. Carston (2002: 171-177) questions this interpretation.

"To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, *together with the identity of any references* that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;…" (Grice 1967, p. 31)

Later on, when he discusses the nondetachability of implicatures, he observes that

"Insofar as the calculation that a particular conversational implicature is present requires, besides contextual and background information, only a knowledge of what has been said (…) it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question." (idem, p. 39)

Except in the case of conversational implicatures that are to be inferred invoking the maxims of manner,[§§] the nondetachability of implicatures implies that it's what is said that matters, and not the way in which it has been said.[***]

Take, for instance, our initial example of Bob telling Anne "She hasn't been to prison yet" about their mutual friend Carol, thereby implicating that she might have started to steal money from the bank she is working at. Any way of expressing the proposition that Carol has not been imprisoned by time t, including various ways to refer to Carol, would carry the same implicature. This seems to agree with a referentialist view on singular terms.

Nonetheless, we are not going to directly address the debate between referentialists and descriptivists, or examine Grice's view about the debate. Our aim is to call attention upon a specific task Grice imposes to the concept of what is said within his theory of implicatures: a demand that seems to be somehow present in all the previous remarks and

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[§§] Grice's supermaxim of manner says 'Be perspicuous', and the maxims concern avoiding obscurity, ambiguity, brevity and order. See section 6 below.

[***] To be sure, Grice makes also the following statement: "(…) the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or 'by putting it that way'" (ibid., p. 39). This is important. The (propositional) content does not carry any implicature, it is the utterance with that content which carries it. Still, it seems clear that one is supposed to identify what has been said to start with the 'calculation' of the implicature. That's what we understand by what sometimes is dubbed as 'input' for the inference of implicatures.

others like the following one:

> "He has said that *p*; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims or at least the CP [cooperative principle]; he could not be doing this unless he thought that *q*; (…)"
> (Grice 1967, p. 31.).

The calculation, inference or working out of conversational implicatures requires the identification of what is said. Among the information required to 'calculate' or infer what the speaker implicated, the hearer must identify, to begin with, what the speaker said. Or, in other words, the proposition expressed by the speaker is the *input* for the inference of implicatures. One may wonder what this demand can tell us about the kind of proposition that best plays that role in the case of utterances containing singular terms: is that a singular proposition, as a referentialist would independently defend, or is it a general proposition, as a descriptivist would expect? Our aim in this paper is to answer that question, leaving aside other arguments about what the best characterization of what is said, or the proposition expressed, or the content of an utterance is. We'll call the proposition that constitutes the input for the inference of implicatures the 'operative content' of the utterance (OC for short) and we will start by considering the following issue. In the case of utterances involving singular terms, is the OC of an utterance a singular or a general proposition?

We'll start by discussing some examples suggesting that the OC of an utterance of a sentence containing a singular term seems to vary between a singular proposition and a general proposition; and, moreover, the general proposition can involve not only linguistic but also psychological mode of presentations or 'cognitive fixes' on the referent. Then, we'll introduce the theory that provides the adequate framework to deal with our approach to the OC of an utterance: Perry's (2001) critical referentialism. Next, we'll address the paradigmatic relationship between our referential devices, singular terms, and our cognitive fixes on objects. We'll also briefly discuss how our approach is positioned with respect to the debate between referentialism and descriptivism on what is said. Then, we'll go back to Grice and consider whether it makes any sense to appeal to any maxim of manner to account

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for the selection of a singular term and the implicatures generated by an utterance containing it. Furthermore, will consider the psychological plausibility of our approach by comparing it with relevance theory. And finally, we will draw some general conclusions about what Grice and others demanded of the notion of what is said by the speaker that utters a sentence containing a singular term.

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5

Come Rain or Come Shine
How to Stop Worrying About Unarticulated Constituents

Stefano Predelli

If, in a 'typical' conversational setting, I tell you 'it is raining', it seems natural for you to assess my utterance for truth-value by looking out of the window. In this sense, so the story goes, the truth-conditions for my utterance depend on the weather where we are: truth is obtainable only as long as it rains there. Yet, so we are told, no expression occurring in (the logical form for) the sentence I employed plays the semantic role of contributing any location: the place remains a fundamentally unarticulated constituent of truth-conditional content. And this much, so the story ends, is a momentous result, one that spells trouble for the traditional understanding of the relationships between meaning and truth, and of the aims and scope of context within a theory of interpretation.

Suppose I say 'it is raining' in Genova. Why should Genova, rather than Rome, end up being truth-conditionally relevant? According to the unarticulationist tale, of course, it need not be. But it is in what I called a 'typical setting', one involving no long-distance telephone calls, no conversations focused on how things happen to be in the capital, no fictional pretence, and no other fancy business of that sort. Genova ends up mattering, in other words, because of certain straightforward features of our setting, probably (though not necessarily) involving my communicative intentions. In what follows, I'll thus settle for the speaker's intentions as the presumably determinant parameter in this respect, though any other account of contextual relevance the unarticulationist may want to take on board would suit my purpose as well.

The unarticulationist idea is thus that the truth-conditions for my utterance depend on Genova because Genova, though not addressed by any expression I uttered, is suitably targeted by my intentions. Why the truth-conditions for my utterance, rather than, say, the truth-conditions for some sort of merely imparted, pragmatically conveyed, suggested content? I shall not bother to wait for the unarticulationist answer to this question, because, as far as my strategy is concerned, this much may be granted without further ado for the sake of the argument (and, mind you, *only* for the sake of the argument).

What remains to be addressed is the reason for all the excitement: no expression I uttered refers to Genova, Genova is nevertheless contextually well placed, and my utterance's truth-conditions depend on the weather in Genova. So what? A lot, according to the unarticulationist: meaning fails to determine truth conditions, there's more to context than anyone previously thought, and the end of semantics is nigh.

So, how does context figure in a standard understanding of semantics? Let me count the ways. (i) It provides the parameters needed by the meaning of indexical expressions. (ii) It provides the circumstance required for a definition of truth. (iii) It figures at the 'pre-semantic' level responsible for the choice of logical form (for instance, for ambiguity resolution, ellipsis unpacking, and the like). Elsewhere, I argued that (ii) provides the traditional tools for an eminently traditional analysis of the rain example, and I am still happy with that solution. Here, for the sake of variety, I am interested in an alternative approach, along the lines of (iii). (There are *so* many replies one can give to the unarticulationist tale, it is a mystery how that story has managed to gain any popularity at all).

Suppose that, instead of saying simply 'it is raining', I say (in Genova):
(1)   It is raining. If it is raining in Genova then it is raining in Rome. Thus, it is raining in Rome.

At least under certain conditions (more about them below), it seems reasonable for you to interpret me as having put forth a logically valid argument. I *need* not, of course, be making a valid argument, just as, in the case of a simple utterance of 'it is raining' in Genova, I need not be talking about Genova. But I may, and, at least in a suitable setting, you may do worse than being impressed by my conclusion, as long as you agree with my premises (never mind why we should both be victims of a rather peculiar view about the meteorological relations between Genova and Rome).

The unarticulationist story gives no clue for the intuition of validity. For, on that story, what enters the picture is a place (say, Genova), not an expression for that place. Equivalently: unarticulationism is a view of truth-conditional content, but content is not the right bearer for logical relations. So, for instance, the following are on a par when it comes to content, but only the former is valid:

(2)   It is raining in Genova. If it is raining in Genova then it is raining in Rome. Thus, it is raining in Rome. (Uttered anywhere)

(3)   It is raining here. If it is raining in Genova then it is raining in Rome. Thus, it is raining in Rome. (Uttered in Genova).

If my addressee was at all inclined to assess my original argument as valid, then, she must have interpreted my contribution along the lines of (2), rather than (3). She must have chosen not a salient *object*, Genova, but a salient *expression*, 'Genova'.

Why that expression? Any factor the unarticulationist may take into account in her views of salience may do the job here. Presumably, the reason lies in the fact that I intended 'Genova' as relevant—a fact which my addressee could easily figure out, given the vicinity of the explicit 'Genova' in the second premise, and given a modicum of charity.

Nothing thus far is by itself particularly troublesome for the unarticulationist: what it shows, so she may happily concede, is that, although some times objects do the job, at other times what is needed is an expression for an object. That is fine. Note however that the contextual contribution now at issue plays a radically different role from the role Genova was supposed to play in the original example. What context now provides is 'Genova', an item that must undergo straightforward semantic interpretation in order

to yield the right truth-conditions for my first premise—truth conditions that depend on a city, not on a name. Which is to say that 'Genova' must occur at the level of logical form, that is, at the syntactic level supplied to the process of semantic interpretation.

How did it get there? Pretty much by definition, because of pre-semantic features of context. Some sentences get 'disambiguated' by appealing to intentions, interests, or what have you. Others get 'unpacked' that way. Others still get 'syntactically enriched' *for one reason or another*. What those reasons turn out to be is of course an independently interesting question. But it is not one that needs to be addressed here, because the need for such syntactic fattening up cuts across the divide between unarticulationists and traditionalists: we all need it.

What about 'it is raining', then? In the simple conversation about the local weather, what my intentions (interests, backgrounds, etc.) provide is, let us grant the unarticulationist, a city. But that does not give the truth-conditions for that *sentence*, given that 'it is raining' might occur in a different setting, say, as part of an argument such as (1), where its logical relations remain underdetermined in the absence of syntactic completion. What (at best) it gives are rather the truth-conditions for a *family* of sentences, those that semantically express a content to the effect that rain occurs in Genova: a family that includes the non truth-conditionally equivalent sentences 'it is raining here' and 'it is raining in Genova'.

Does it then make sense at all to speak of the truth-conditions for an *utterance*? Of course it does. These are coarse-grained truth-conditions, unable to provide an account of some truth-conditional properties such as entailment, but more than good enough for many purposes. I say 'it is raining'. Sometimes you may wonder: does that entail that it is raining in Rome, on the basis of my acceptance of 'if it is raining in Genova, it is raining in Rome'? But many times you could not care less: he said that it is raining here/in Genova/where we are/at this place or whatever, and that's good enough reason for looking for the umbrella. Many truth-conditionally distinct sentences do that job, and their truth-conditional peculiarities do not matter on that occasion.

Given an approach along these lines, then, what is the logical form for 'it is raining', uttered in isolation? Grant (for the argument's sake, and only ofr the argument's sake) all that I have granted to the unarticulationist cause. What follows is that, in typical settings, where no background consideration motivates the choice of one or another expression, there simply is no such thing as *the* logical form appropriate on that occasion. What is at our disposal is however a family of logical forms: any logical form will do the job, as long as it contains an expression referring to Genova. And this much is just what the traditional semantic picture expects. If what background supplies is merely a 'salient object', what is obtainable is at best a family of truth-conditions—or, if you prefer, truth-conditions in the eminently coarse sense appropriate for an utterance. In a nutshell: if unarticulated constituency is not a myth, it is a resounding confirmation of the traditional understanding of pre-semantic context, and of the relationships between interpretable syntactic structures and their semantic evaluation.