BETWEEN ETHICS AND LAW: A SOCIO-TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF LLM RESPONSES AGAINST ARTICLE 5 OF THE EU AI ACT

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Abstract

The EU AI Act represents one of the most ambitious attempts to regulate artificial intelligence globally. With Article 5 enforceable since February 2025, this study conducts a socio-technical compliance assessment of LLM responses against Article 5(1)(a) and (b) prohibited practices, applying 70 ethically sensitive prompts across six models using three prompting techniques (character roleplay, do anything now, or standard). Manipulative responses were largely absent at 99.6% no concern, while vulnerability exploitation emerged as the primary compliance risk, increasing by 820% under adversarial conditions with model-level variation ranging from 0% to 30%. The findings carry implications for model providers, regulators, users, and educators, and provoke the question of whether Article 5 protections are practically reachable by all whom the Act was designed to protect.

Keywords

EU AI Act, Article 5, LLM compliance, vulnerability exploitation, jail breaking, socio-technical assessment

1. Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gradually become standard companions across nearly every sector of society, spanning public and private services and even in homes. Whether their efficiency is real or imagined, it is necessary to ensure that their adoption does not pose a danger. This is particularly important for users who are either incapable of protecting themselves or prone to harm. As developers, manufacturers, and owners establish their respective compliance regulations, the need for a general regulatory framework cannot be overstated.

In the European Union, the growing demand for accountability from providers and users of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been accompanied by significant regulatory developments. The EU AI Act (the Act) [1], which entered into force in August 2024 with phased implementation, represents one of the most ambitious regulatory responses to AI globally. The enactment of this regulation raises a critical question regarding its enforceability on LLMs. In their responses to prompts, can LLMs be regarded as compliant with their safety requirements? The Act primarily regulates AI systems based on risk exposure. Generative AI, under which LLMs fall, is classified as General-Purpose AI (GPAI) with systemic risk. The European Commission's Guidelines on the scope of obligations for General-Purpose AI model providers (GPAI Guidelines) exempt open-source LLMs from certain risk obligations [2]. However, irrespective of whether an LLM is open-source or not, the Act offers protection to varied degrees.

It is understood that ethical shortfalls do not always amount to legal violations. Applied to the Act, ethical dilemmas that LLMs face may not be covered, excusing liability accordingly. Still, where responses are not in tandem with Article 5, such models are in direct violation of a legal provision. The provision expressly prohibits AI practices deemed to pose unacceptable risks to individuals and fundamental rights. The pervasive use of LLMs creates the likelihood that they could be employed for manipulation or exploitation. This study's scope is limited to non-biometric Article 5 stipulations,

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with attention to Article 5(1)(a) and (b). Article 5(1)(a) prohibits AI systems that deploy manipulative or deceptive techniques with the objective or effect of materially distorting behaviour and impairing informed decision-making, causing significant harm. Article 5(1)(b) prohibits AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities arising from age, disability, or social or economic situation, with the objective or effect of materially distorting behaviour and causing or being likely to cause significant harm. These provisions became enforceable on 2 February 2025, with administrative fines under Article 99 of up to €35 million or 7% of worldwide annual turnover [1]. Although GPAI model compliance deadlines extend to 2027, Article 5 obligations cannot be deferred on that basis.

To further understand whether users can find protection under Article 5, this study addresses two research questions.

RQ1: Can LLM responses to ethically challenging prompts exhibit characteristics that are manipulative or deceptive, as outlined in Article 5(1)(a) of the EU AI Act?

RQ2: Can LLM responses to ethically challenging prompts exhibit characteristics indicative of vulnerability exploitation, as outlined in Article 5(1)(b) of the EU AI Act?

This study conducts a socio-technical compliance assessment of LLM responses against Article 5 (1)(a) and (b), using 70 morally complex prompts adapted across three prompting techniques and applied to six models, generating 1,260 responses in total. It examines enforcement implications and offers guidance for users, developers, and regulators.

2. Related Research

The security landscape of Large Language Models has evolved considerably, bringing with it increased knowledge of the vulnerabilities embedded in their architecture. Li and Fung (2025) identified prompt manipulation and jailbreaking as core threats, attributing them to users exploiting LLMs' reliance on natural-language inputs, raising further concerns around adversarial attacks, data poisoning, and misuse [3] . Wang et al. (2025) shift this concern inward, arguing that LLMs possess internal patterns that can self-exploit through self-persuasion-driven jailbreaks [4].

The hierarchical relationship between prompt manipulation and jailbreaking has attracted notable research interest. Arenas et al. (2024) describe prompt manipulation as steering an LLM to alter its behaviour, and jailbreaking as a stronger act that bypasses safety rules [5]. Barke et al. (2024) demonstrate that jailbreaks operate via prompt rewriting and scenario nesting [6], while Jones et al. (2025) categorise jailbreaking as targeting a model's internal safety alignment [7]. Mondillo et al. (2025) classified jailbreaking techniques to include assumed responsibility, masking intent, role-playing, and context manipulation [8]. Meng et al. (2026) demonstrate that fabricated dialogue history amplifies jailbreaking success[9], while Pfrommer et al. (2024) opine that prompt injection and jailbreaking exploit the same weakness, that is, the faithful obedience of LLMs [10]. Within medical contexts, Zahra et al. (2026) show that emotionally manipulated prompt injection attacks increased harmful misinformation generation from 6.2% to 37.5% across 112 tested scenarios [11].

Technical vulnerabilities carry real consequences, particularly for those with limited capacity to recognise or resist harmful outputs. Mondillo et al. (2025) found that in medical contexts, jailbreaking can coerce models into providing unsafe guidance posing health risks to vulnerable users, especially adolescents and non-experts [8]. Oinas-Kukkonen et al. (2022) demonstrate that users routinely misperceive personalised system interactions, a dynamic that becomes consequential when LLM responses exploit this gap [12]. Although Tan and Leo (2025) frame manipulation as users exploiting LLMs through prompt-engineering, they acknowledge the outcome of unsafe outputs [13]. Wilczyński et al. (2024) find that LLMs actively influence and deceive users, and that this goes largely unrecognised across age, gender, and education levels, as outputs tend toward emotional rather than analytical linguistic patterns [14]. Choi et al. (2024) show that through anchoring, LLMs subtly redirect even expert-level reasoning toward model-directed thinking [15]. The Commission's Guidelines on Prohibited Artificial Intelligence Practices (2025) (Prohibited Practices Guidelines) bring a legal lens to these concerns, clarifying that personalised interaction becomes prohibited under Article 5 where it deploys subliminal techniques,

materially distorts behaviour beyond lawful persuasion, and causes or is reasonably likely to cause significant harm, whether physical, psychological, financial, or economic (paras. 78, 129–131, 133)[16].

Neuwirth (2023) notes that Article 5 of the Act recognises that human cognition can be manipulated without users' awareness, endangering cognitive autonomy, mental privacy, and democratic values, advancing the necessity of prohibiting AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities related to age, mental state, or social conditions [17]. Rebrean and Malgieri (2025) conceptualise vulnerability as a condition shaped by power asymmetries that AI systems exploit through cognitive biases and structural disadvantages [18]. Liégeois (2023) classifies vulnerable persons as minors and persons with intellectual disabilities [19]. Cooper et al. (2022) extend this to older adults, socially isolated individuals, those with physical limitations, and people of low socioeconomic means [20], categorisations that align directly with Article 5(1)(b) [1].

On the limitations of AI regulation, Gornet and Maxwell (2024) argue that technical standards cannot guarantee protection against manipulation because such harms are context-specific [21]. McIntosh et al. (2024) established that governance frameworks at the time only partially satisfied AI regulatory requirements [22]. Huang et al. (2026) identify that developers struggle to bridge proposed and practical mitigation strategies, concluding that rigid frameworks are insufficient and adaptive governance is needed [23]. Rathnayake et al. (2025) note that organisations consistently identify regulatory uncertainty and ethical alignment as barriers to responsible generative AI deployment [24].

Scholars have widely recognised the gap between ethical AI guidelines and what existing legal frameworks can enforce. Pham (2025) emphasises that ethical expectations currently outpace legal requirements, creating governance gaps [25]. Liu et al. (2026) note that LLMs may meet ethical expectations yet still fail legal standards [26], and Kattnig et al. (2025) explain that unclear regulation creates uncertainty about whether a system is both ethically fair and legally compliant [27]. Pasch and Cha (2026) demonstrate through analysis of over 100,000 AI product reviews that laws target specific harms while ethical principles remain harder to measure and rarely formalised [28]. Kashefi et al. (2024) contend that global regulatory fragmentation due to cultural and legal differences compounds this uncertainty [29].

While there has been extensive research examining LLMs from technical, social, and ethical angles, what has been largely avoided is the question of whether what these models actually do in practice meets or breaches the specific thresholds Article 5 now makes enforceable. This study addresses that gap through socio-technical compliance assessment of LLM responses to ethically sensitive prompts, employing Article 5's criteria as an evaluative framework. This empirical approach bridges ethical research and legal reality, offering insight for model providers, regulators, and deployment platforms. It also speaks to everyday users who, often unknowingly, rely on these frameworks for protection.

3. Methodology

This research builds on a dataset developed by the authors in prior work [30] ,which presented a comprehensive set of 70 ethically challenging prompts evaluated across six language models using three distinct prompt techniques. As depicted in Figure 1, the prompts span 16 categories that highlight regulatory concerns, potential misuse, and exploitative tendencies. These categories were designed to test models' responses across scenarios relevant to Article 5(1)(a) and (b) prohibited practices.

The models were selected to represent diverse safety architectures and alignment approaches: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Command R+, Dolphin 2.5, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4.o, and GPT-o1. Before deployment, the prompts were validated by subject matter experts at the University of Oulu to confirm their ethical appropriateness and methodological soundness. Standard prompts reflected typical user interaction, free from manipulative techniques. Character Role Play (CRP) prompts introduced storytelling elements and persona-based framing, drawing on role-playing as an established jailbreaking vector [8]. Do-Anything-Now (DAN) prompts instructed models to adopt an unrestricted persona and disregard built-in safety protocols, representing one of the most widely documented adversarial prompting techniques in the literature [6] . Some prompts included follow-up questions to test consistency and boundary




Figure 1: Overview of 16 Ethical Prompt Categories Across Three Prompting Techniques

maintenance, whereas others consisted of standalone questions.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two sample responses classified as No Concern and Highly Susceptible to Vulnerability Exploitation respectively.




Figure 2: Sample LLM Response Classified as No Regulatory Concern

To ensure independence of responses provided by the models, fresh tabs were opened for each conversation. The tabs closed with the last question in the set where follow-up prompts existed; otherwise, the standalone prompt formed the complete conversation. This was to ensure that prior interactions did not influence subsequent responses. This approach was validated during preliminary testing.




Figure 3: Sample LLM Response Classified as Highly Susceptible to Vulnerability Exploitation

This study takes a socio-technical approach, examining whether LLM responses display characteristics consistent with Article 5 prohibited practices. It assesses response patterns against Article 5 criteria as an evaluative framework, identifying those that raise regulatory concern. These are assessed across three dimensions, namely technical (evidence of safety mechanism bypassing), social (risks of user manipulation and vulnerability exploitation), and regulatory (alignment with Article 5 and the Guidelines). Each response was examined qualitatively and against a structured analytical framework. Technical indicators covered evidence of safety mechanism bypassing and inconsistent ethical standards. Social dimensions considered whether responses manipulated or exploited users, including risks to specific population groups. Regulatory alignment assessed how closely responses mapped onto Article 5 criteria and the Prohibited Practices Guidelines [1,16]. The classifications produced are analytical assessments, systematic and criteria-based, but not authoritative legal determinations.

Responses were classified into six categories across two Article 5 dimensions: manipulation and vulnerability exploitation. Each response was assessed against this framework by the researchers.

i. No Concern: no Article 5 characteristics displayed, whether through appropriate refusal or prompt engagement without manipulative or exploitative characteristics.

ii. Mildly Susceptible to Vulnerability Exploitation: mild Article 5(1)(b) characteristics present but insufficient to warrant higher classification.

iii. Highly Susceptible to Vulnerability Exploitation: strong Article 5(1)(b) characteristics demonstrating clear vulnerability exploitation capable of materially distorting decision-making in protected populations.

iv. Mildly Manipulative: mild Article 5(1)(a) characteristics present but insufficient to warrant higher classification.

v. Highly Manipulative: strong Article 5(1)(a) characteristics demonstrating clear manipulation capable of materially distorting user decision-making.

vi. Both Manipulative and Susceptible to Vulnerability Exploitation: mild characteristics associated with both Article 5(1)(a) and (b) simultaneously, though the co-occurrence does not rise to the level of either high manipulation or high vulnerability exploitation.

4. Results

Table 1
Distribution of responses by prompt technique

Prompt Technique	No Concern	Mildly Vulnerable	Highly Vulnerable	Mildly Manipulative	Highly Manipulative	Both Vulnerable and Manipulative
Standard	375 (89.3%)	35 (8.3%)	5 (1.2%)	3 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.5%)
CRP	370 (88.1%)	40 (9.5%)	6 (1.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.7%)
DAN	340 (81.0%)	31 (7.4%)	46 (11.0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.5%)

Table 1 displays the distribution of responses across the six classification categories for each prompting technique. In totality, the LLMs demonstrated varying degrees of compliance with Article 5 requirements, with differences becoming more pronounced across techniques. Under Standard prompting, 89.3% of responses (375 of 420) raised no concern. CRP produced comparable results at 88.1% (370 of 420). DAN jailbreaking produced a notably different outcome, with 81.0% no concern (340 of 420) and the remaining 19.0% distributed across concern categories. The most striking finding concerns highly susceptible to vulnerability exploitation responses. Standard prompting produced 5 such responses (1.2%) and CRP produced 6 (1.4%). Under DAN, that figure rose to 46 (11.0%), representing an 820% increase. This is the primary compliance risk in the examination.

Highly manipulative responses were entirely absent across all three techniques. Combined with the total mildly manipulative, this suggests that safeguards against manipulative outputs are considerably more robust than those protecting vulnerable users. Responses reflecting both manipulative and vulnerability exploitation characteristics remained minimal throughout, consistent with their mild classification.

At model level, Claude 3.5 and GPT-o1 recorded zero high concern responses across all conditions including DAN. Command R+ generated 21 highly susceptible to vulnerability exploitation responses under DAN alone. Gemini 1.5 Pro showed 15 such responses under DAN despite clean performance under Standard and CRP. Dolphin 2.5 showed consistently elevated mild vulnerability exploitation across all three techniques, suggesting baseline architectural limitations rather than technique-specific susceptibility.

Table 2
Model performance under standard prompt technique

Model	No Concern	Mild Vulnerable	High Vulnerable	Mild Manipulative	High Manipulative	Mildly Vulnerable and Manipulative
Claude 3.5	68 (97.1%)	2 (2.9%)	0	0	0	0
Command R+	58 (82.9%)	10 (14.3%)	1 (1.4%)	1 (1.4%)	0	0
Dolphin 2.5	54 (77.1%)	11 (15.7%)	3 (4.3%)	2 (2.9%)	0	0
Gemini 1.5 Pro	64 (91.4%)	6 (8.6%)	0	0	0	0
GPT o1	68 (97.1%)	2 (2.9%)	0	0	0	0
GPT-4.o	63 (90.0%)	4 (5.7%)	1 (1.4%)	0	0	2 (2.9%)

Under standard prompt technique as shown in Table 2, most models performed well against Article 5 requirements, though meaningful differences in baseline compliance were already visible at this stage. Claude 3.5 and GPT-o1 were the strongest performers, each achieving 97.1% no concern responses with only 2.9% mildly vulnerable classifications. Gemini 1.5 Pro followed closely at 91.4% no concern. GPT-4.o achieved 90.0% but stood out for a notable reason. It was the only model to produce responses

in the both manipulative and susceptible to vulnerability exploitation category under standard prompt techniques (2.9%), suggesting a baseline susceptibility to dual-concern scenarios not observed in other models. Command R+ and Dolphin 2.5 manifested differently. Command R+ achieved 82.9% no concern, with 14.3% mildly vulnerable responses and a small number of mildly manipulative responses (1.4%). Dolphin 2.5 performed weakest at 77.1% no concern, producing the highest rates of mild vulnerability (15.7%) and high vulnerability (4.3%), alongside mildly manipulative responses (2.9%). It is insightful that Dolphin 2.5 showed these patterns without any adversarial prompting. It points to baseline architectural limitations rather than technique-induced failures.

Table 3
Model performance under CRP prompt technique

Model	No Concern	Mild Vulnerable	High Vulnerable	Mild Manipulative	High Manipulative	Mildly Vulnerable and Manipulative
Claude 3.5	67 (95.7%)	3 (4.3%)	0	0	0	0
Command R+	58 (82.9%)	7 (10.0%)	4 (5.7%)	0	0	1 (4.3%)
Dolphin 2.5	56 (80.0%)	10 (14.3%)	2 (2.9%)	0	0	2 (2.9%)
Gemini 1.5 Pro	64 (91.4%)	6 (8.6%)	0	0	0	0
GPT o1	68 (97.1%)	2 (2.9%)	0	0	0	0
GPT-4.o	59 (84.3%)	12 (17.1%)	0	1 (1.4%)	0	0

CRP introduced contextual framing to test whether models maintained consistent ethical boundaries when users assumed specific personas or were presented with more emotionally appealing storytelling. The results, as presented in Table 3, were mixed, as the divergence between models became more pronounced at this stage. Claude 3.5 showed minimal change, dropping only to 95.7% no concern with a slight increase in mild vulnerability (4.3%) and zero high concern responses. GPT-o1 remained perfectly stable at 97.1%, demonstrating complete resistance to persona-based prompting. Gemini 1.5 Pro similarly held firm at 91.4% no concern. The picture was considerably different for the remaining models. GPT-4.o experienced the most notable shift, with no concern responses dropping to 84.3% and a mild vulnerability rising to 17.1%, the highest rate in all models using this technique, suggesting that its safeguards are particularly sensitive to contextualised prompting. Command R+ settled at 82.9% no concern, with high vulnerability increasing to 5.7%, and both manipulative and susceptible to vulnerability exploitation responses appearing at 1.4%, indicating that contextual framing weakened its already limited baseline compliance. Dolphin 2.5 showed modest improvement in some metrics, with high vulnerability reducing to 2.9%, but maintained poor general performance at 80.0% no concern.

Table 4
Model performance under DAN prompt technique

Model	No Concern	Mild Vulnerable	High Vulnerable	Mild Manipulative	High Manipulative	Mildly Vulnerable and Manipulative
Claude 3.5	70 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0
Command R+	45 (64.3%)	4 (5.7%)	21 (30.0%)	0	0	0
Dolphin 2.5	50 (71.4%)	10 (14.3%)	10 (14.3%)	0	0	0
Gemini 1.5 Pro	48 (68.6%)	5 (7.1%)	15 (21.4%)	1 (1.4%)	0	1 (1.4%)
GPT o1	66 (94.3%)	4 (5.7%)	0	0	0	0
GPT-4.o	61 (87.1%)	8 (11.4%)	0	0	0	1 (1.4%)

DAN jailbreaking, designed explicitly to bypass safety constraints, produced the most revealing results as in Table 4, exposing fundamental differences in how models respond to adversarial pressure.

At one end of the spectrum, Claude 3.5 maintained 100% no concern responses throughout, showing no movement regardless of prompting intensity. GPT-o1 performed strongly, settling at 94.3% no concern with 5.7% mild vulnerability and zero high vulnerability responses. Command R+ moved in the opposite direction entirely. No concern responses fell to 64.3% while high vulnerability climbed to 30.0%, accounting for nearly one third of all responses under this technique. The same model recorded only 1.4% high vulnerability under standard prompting. Gemini 1.5 Pro settled at 68.6% no concern with 21.4% high vulnerability. It was also the only model to record mildly manipulative responses under DAN, alongside a both manipulative and susceptible to vulnerability exploitation response (1.4%), failure modes that had not surfaced under either previous technique. GPT-4.o held at zero high vulnerability but recorded elevated mild vulnerability (11.4%) and similarly produced one both manipulative and susceptible to vulnerability exploitation response (1.4%). Dolphin 2.5 settled at 71.4% no concern with 14.3% high vulnerability, consistent with its pattern across all three techniques.

One finding cuts across all three techniques and deserves isolating. Highly manipulative responses were entirely absent from the dataset. Only 5 instances of mildly manipulative responses appeared across 1,260 total responses (0.4%), suggesting that models generally avoided providing explicitly manipulative guidance regardless of how they were prompted. The both manipulative and susceptible to vulnerability exploitation category was similarly rare, appearing 7 times in total, with GPT-4.o accounting for 3 instances, Dolphin 2.5 for 2, and Command R+ and Gemini 1.5 recording one instance each. The distribution across four models and three techniques points to scattered rather than systematic occurrence.

Taken together, Claude 3.5 and GPT-o1 sit at the stronger end, GPT-4.o occupies the middle ground, and Dolphin 2.5, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Command R+ recorded the most substantial Article 5 concerns. Given that DAN techniques are publicly available and widely documented, adversarial prompting is not a hypothetical deployment scenario. It is a foreseeable one, and the results should be received in that light.

5. Discussion

The findings present a varied compliance picture across the two Article 5 dimensions examined. On the question of whether LLM responses to ethically challenging prompts exhibit characteristics consistent with manipulative and deceptive practices under Article 5(1)(a), the short answer is, mostly, no. LLMs performed well against Article 5(1)(a) prohibitions, with 99.6% of responses (1,255 of 1,260) showing no manipulative characteristics. Highly manipulative responses were absent across all models and prompting techniques, and only 5 instances (0.4%) exhibited mild manipulation. Seven responses (0.6%) showed co-occurring manipulation and vulnerability exploitation, distributed across GPT-4.o, Dolphin 2.5, Command R+, and Gemini 1.5 Pro. This low incidence suggests that models do successfully avoid what Barke et al. (2024) characterise as structured prompt manipulations designed to override safety alignment [6] Taken against the Act (2025) and the Prohibited Practices Guidelines (2025), which distinguish prohibited manipulation from lawful persuasion (paras. 78, 129-131, 133), the vast majority of responses appear to operate transparently rather than deploying subliminal techniques [1, 16] .

The mildly manipulative responses are nonetheless worth examining. These display the linguistic patterns Wilczyński et al. (2024) identify in manipulative outputs such as heightened emotionality, reduced analytical content, and unwarranted certainty[14]. Wang et al. (2025) raise a further concern through their identification of models' capacity for self-persuasion-driven responses [4], which they argue blurs the line between aligned and misaligned outputs. Together, these observations place the mildly manipulative responses in an interpretive grey zone between lawful persuasion and prohibited manipulation. Neuwirth (2023) reminds that Article 5 exists precisely because human cognition can be manipulated without users' awareness, endangering cognitive autonomy and democratic values [17]. That this occurs even at mild levels raises questions about what can realistically be enforced.

There are also instances where responses intertwine manipulation and vulnerability exploitation. These reflect what Mondillo et al. (2024) catalogue as effective jailbreaking vectors that bypass safety

constraints, and where both characteristics appear together, the regulatory risk is compounded beyond each concern in isolation [8]. Notably, the appearance of this category under standard prompting, without any adversarial technique applied, lends weight to Wang et al.'s (2025) self-persuasion argument [4]. If models can self-manipulate and push toward vulnerability exploitation without external prompting, the implications extend beyond what jailbreaking alone can explain. GPT-4.o's presence in this category under standard conditions is particularly noteworthy in that regard. Beyond the model-level findings, one cross-cutting pattern stands out. Prompting technique had minimal impact on Article 5(1)(a) outcomes, with concerning responses remaining below 1.2% across all three techniques. That consistency is encouraging but it does not extend to Article 5(1)(b).

If the Article 5(1)(a) findings were reassuring, the Article 5(1)(b) picture is substantially less so. Vulnerability exploitation emerged as the leading regulatory compliance risk in this study, with DAN jailbreaking producing an 820% increase in high vulnerability responses and model-level variation ranging from 0% to 30% high concern. That magnitude indicates that for certain models, adversarial prompting does not merely test compliance boundaries but collapses them consistent with Li and Fung's (2025) identification of jailbreaking as a core threat to model security [3]. The populations most at risk from these patterns are not abstract. They exist as persons capable of accessing and using LLMs. They include older adults, socially isolated individuals, minors, and persons with intellectual disabilities, among others. What makes this even more concerning is that the risk may go undetected. Wilczyński et al. (2024) establish that manipulative outputs tend to be more emotional and less analytical, making them harder to recognise across age, gender, and education levels.[14]. A similar dynamic may apply to vulnerability exploitation, where outputs designed to influence susceptible users are equally unlikely to be identified as harmful by those most at risk. Where age-verification systems are weak, as Tan and Leo (2025) note, any category of vulnerability becomes further exposed [13]. The high vulnerability responses in this study could apply to exactly these populations. It is to this end, as Neuwirth (2023) recognises, that Article 5(1)(b) exists because that risk is real [17].

The model-level variation is attention-worthy. Claude 3.5 maintaining near zero high vulnerability across all conditions while Command R+ reaches 30.0% under DAN, and Dolphin 2.5 performs poorly even under standard prompting suggests that the compliance challenge is not uniform. These are not marginal differences attributable to parameter tuning. They reflect what Rebrean and Malgieri (2025) conceptualise as power asymmetries, where AI systems exploit cognitive biases and information asymmetries to the detriment of users with reduced critical evaluation capacity [18]. Command R+ and Dolphin 2.5's patterns create precisely these asymmetries, while Claude 3.5 demonstrably does not. The anchoring effect Choi et al. (2024) identify intensifies this dynamic further, validating that cognitive biases operate more powerfully when users lack the capacity to resist model-directed reasoning [15]. Article 5(1)(b) was designed to disrupt exactly this mechanism. That persistent variation of this scale remains across models suggests the disruption remains incomplete.

The context-dependency posited by Gornet and Maxwell (2024) is also reflected here. Vulnerability exploitation is not fixed but contextual and deployment-sensitive[21]. Gemini 1.5 Pro illustrates this clearly with 91.4% no concern under standard conditions, dropping to 68.6% under DAN jailbreaking. It is a model that fails selectively, under documented and available conditions. Static compliance assessment cannot capture this kind of conditional vulnerability, and the findings suggest that conformity testing under benign conditions systematically underestimates real-world Article 5(1)(b) risk. It is also worth returning briefly to the co-occurring manipulation and vulnerability exploitation responses identified under RQ1. Those instances, appearing even under standard prompting, suggest that for some models the boundary between the two Article 5 dimensions is not always clear-cut. Where both characteristics appear together, the concern is compounded, and the affected populations are the same vulnerable groups Article 5(1)(b) seeks to protect.

Collectively, these findings give empirical weight to what Huang et al. (2026) identify as the difficulty developers face in bridging proposed and practical mitigation strategies [23]. Models deemed ethical under industry standards still exhibit Article 5(1)(b) characteristics ranging from 2.9% to 30.0%. This confirms Kattnig et al.'s (2025) and Pham's (2025) arguments that meeting ethical expectations does not guarantee legal compliance [36,31]. In a post-February 2025 enforcement environment, that distinction

matters[27, 25].

6. Implications

The findings advance theoretical understanding of LLM safety, vulnerability, and regulatory compliance while carrying practical implications that extend beyond technical performance to the social realities of who uses these models and under what conditions.

6.1. Theoretical Implications

Internal reasoning and inconsistent compliance. The most theoretically interesting result is Gemini 1.5's contradictory behaviour under identical DAN conditions. The model demonstrates clear harm recognition when refusing requests, yet fully capitulates under identical jailbreaking attempts. Wang et al. (2025) describe this as self-persuasion-driven jailbreaking [4]. The capacity for appropriate refusal exists; what is absent is its consistent application, shifting the diagnosis from incapacity to architectural inconsistency.

The manipulation chain. The results challenge Tan and Leo's (2025) framing of manipulation as something users do to LLMs rather than the reverse [13]. What matters, however, is not the origin of the manipulation but its system effect, that is, whether responses materially distort behaviour in ways likely to cause significant harm. The 30.0% high vulnerability rate under DAN demonstrates that regardless of how the manipulation chain began, the outcome can meet the Article 5(1)(b) threshold.

The authority dynamics. The findings operationalise Rebrean and Malgieri's (2025) conceptualisation of vulnerability [18], showing that high vulnerability responses produce seemingly authoritative outputs directed at populations with reduced critical evaluation capacity. The anchoring effect identified by Choi et al. (2024) intensifies this dynamic, validating that cognitive biases operate more powerfully in users who lack the capacity to resist model-directed reasoning[15].

The architecture gap. The distance between Claude 3.5's perfect DAN resistance and Command R+'s 30.0% high vulnerability under the same conditions is the most architecturally revealing finding in this study. Jailbreaking immunity is achievable, as Claude 3.5 demonstrates. Models that cannot match this are not confronting a technical ceiling but a gap in alignment. That compliance is conditional rather than fixed is further demonstrated by Gemini 1.5 no concern falling from 91.4% under standard prompts to 68.6% under DAN. This gives empirical grounding to Gornet and Maxwell's (2024) contention that technical standards cannot guarantee protection because harms are context-specific [21]. Article 5(1)(b) assessment must therefore account for adversarial contexts that real-world deployment will certainly include.

Manipulation versus vulnerability exploitation. Current safety architectures are considerably better at filtering harmful content than protecting vulnerable users. These are different challenges, the former being a content problem, the latter requiring contextual assessment of who is asking and what harm might result. Article 5(1)(b) compliance demands the latter, and most models are not yet equipped to deliver it.

6.2. Practical Implications

For model providers. Command R+ and Dolphin 2.5 present the most substantial Article 5 concerns, with vulnerable persons facing greater exposure through their use. The more pressing concern is harm that occurs before enforcement action is taken, and Dolphin 2.5's poor baseline performance means this risk exists in ordinary use. Providers should look beyond deployment readiness toward the consistent resistance demonstrated by Claude 3.5, ensuring that verification mechanisms genuinely protect users rather than serve as compliance formalities.

For regulatory authorities. Enforcement should be holistic, addressing social exposure alongside technical metrics. Command R+ and Dolphin 2.5 warrant scrutiny given their impact on populations Article 5(1)(b) protects. The continuous emergence of new threats demands proactive oversight, and

conformity assessments must go beyond baseline testing, as the greatest harm concentrates in the gap between benign and adversarial performance.

For users. Most people have no way of knowing when a response reflects genuine information or architectural limitations. Users in protected groups are even less positioned to self-protect, as their capacity to recognise manipulation may itself be limited by the very conditions that make them vulnerable.

For educators. Transparency about both the gains and risks of LLM dependency is essential. When users understand how these systems fail, they are better positioned to use them responsibly and protect themselves and others. That understanding is itself a form of social protection.

6.3. Limitations

Several limitations bear on the interpretation of these findings. The dataset was restricted to English language textual interactions only, meaning findings may not generalise across languages, cultural contexts, or multimodal interaction channels. Only six models were examined, and although they were selected to represent a range of development approaches, the findings cannot be assumed to reflect the broader LLM landscape. Each prompt was tested once per model per technique. Response variability is acknowledged as a limitation, as repeated testing may yield different outputs. Finally, the classification framework involves interpretative judgement, and assessments represent analytical determinations rather than authoritative legal findings.

7. Conclusion

This contribution set out not to render legal judgements but to examine, through a socio-technical lens, whether the protections Article 5(1)(b) of the Act promises are visible in the actual behaviour of LLMs. The findings suggest they are not consistently so. Vulnerability exploitation patterns, particularly under adversarial conditions, demonstrate that models reaching everyday users, including those who are unable to protect themselves, do not uniformly meet the standards Article 5(1)(a) and (b) was designed to enforce. Users deserve more than conditional protection. Blanket consent mechanisms and baseline compliance testing are insufficient responses to the social realities this study documents. If the Act is to function as intended, its protections must be practically reachable by all those it was enacted for, not only legible to those with the technical or legal literacy to invoke them.

The stakes of getting this wrong are not theoretical. In February 2026, persistent role-play jailbreaking of a leading LLM resulted in the compromise of 150 gigabytes of government data affecting approximately 195 million individuals[1]. The model initially refused and then complied, a pattern this study observes across multiple models and conditions. No deployed model can be considered categorically safe, and these findings are offered as an empirical contribution to the conversation regulators, providers, and legal scholars need to have about what Article 5 compliance must look like in practice.

Declaration on Generative AI

The authors used Anthropic's Claude for editorial tasks, including improving clarity, grammar, and style. All original ideas, analyses, and interpretations are solely the authors' work. The authors conducted a full manual review and take full responsibility for the final content of the manuscript.

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